
































Jacqueline Lambiase, Major Professor 
James Mueller, Committee Member 
Richard Wells, Committee Member 
Mitchell Land, Director of the Frank W. 
Mayborn Institute of Journalism 
Jim Albright, Chair of the Department of 
Journalism 
C. Neal Tate, Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse 
School of Graduate Studies 
THE EXTERNAL CONFLICT OF MODERN WAR CORRESPONDENTS: 
TECHNOLOGY’S INEVITABLE IMPACT ON THE EXTINCTION  
OF NOSTALGIC COMBAT REPORTING 
James Colby Horton, B.A. 
Thesis Prepared for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 




Horton, James Colby. The External Conflict of Modern War Correspondents: 
Technology’s Inevitable Impact on the Extinction of Nostalgic Combat Reporting. 
Master of Arts (Journalism), August 2002, 136 pp., 10 tables, reference list, 111 titles. 
Through historical and content analyses of war coverage, this study qualitatively 
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understand the tension between Vietnam and Afghanistan war correspondents and their 
military counterparts. Early American democracy aspired to give total freedom to its 
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Since the Vietnam era, the relationship between the military and the media has been 
plagued by questions of censorship, assertions of falsehood, and threats to national 
security. But it is the technological advancements in both reporting and combat 
techniques that have caused a disappearance of the nostalgic war coverage that American 
correspondents once prospered from. The possibility of returning to journalists’ vision of 
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The concept and definition of democracy have changed dramatically since its
inception. The meaning of democracy is broad in scope, and scholars and critics alike
have attempted to find the true denotation of the democratic idea. The Greek philosopher
Plato regarded democracy as “full of variety and disorder.” In his book The Republic,
Plato writes:
Democracy then comes when the poor get the power, putting some who are
against them to death, sending others away, and then letting everyone have an
equal part in the rulers’ rights and offices. And most commonly in such
governments the positions are given by lot (Plato, trans. 1960)
Although Plato’s view of the formation of democracy was critically pessimistic,
the United States was founded upon democratic ideas. Immigrants from northern Europe
came to escape oppression and gain eventual religious, economic, and political freedoms.
To that end, early American democracy aspired to give total freedom to its people. The
concept of a free press evolved from this essential idea of democracy. This idea was
instilled in our democracy by the founders of the American experience. William
Blackstone had an enormous influence upon the framers of the Constitution. He once
wrote, “The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state” (Sunstein,
1993, p. xiii). The first amendment to the Constitution eventually stated, “Congress shall
make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Unchanged since its
creation, this statement became the doctrine of the American democratic system.
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Essentially, our forefathers created three estates to help balance the power that
Plato so openly criticized. Each estate (legislative, executive, and judicial) would
ultimately become a watchdog of the other two branches of government. Often touted as
the “fourth estate,” the press has been granted the inherent right to inform the public
about political issues and public affairs, thus becoming a watchdog as well. But another
entity must emerge for the success of any democracy; the American military must protect
the concept of American democracy at home and abroad.
It appears, however, that no other domestic entity has challenged the freedom of
the press clause set forth by the Constitution of the United States more than the American
military (Kennedy, 1993; Young & Jesser, 1997). The relationship between the American
news media and the military has often been shrouded by questions of censorship (Price,
1942; Sharkey, 1991; Hallin, 1986;), threats to national security (Braestrup, 1978; Mohr,
1983), and blatant or unknown falsehood (Hammond, 1998). Both institutions are
imperative to American democracy (Fallows, 1996; Sharkey, 2001), but during times of
war, tension inevitably grows between them.
The pinnacle of success for any democracy is the ability of citizens to receive
unfiltered information about their government. It should be the obligation of the press to
fulfill this role – ultimately becoming the vital link between the government and the
public. Perhaps this is where the relationship between the military and the media is often
damaged. The crucial relationship between the “people, their government and their
Army” is dubbed by war theorist Carl von Clausewitz as the “remarkable trinity” (as
cited in Summers, 1986, p. 6). The media, in turn, are the essential link between each
element within this trinity. But in times of conflict, the media’s reporting often alters the
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relationship among the entities of the trinity, causing deep military bitterness toward the
media as a whole (Sharkey, 1991, p. 39).
As the young nation developed, the press quickly became the source for reaching
people of the United States. Even during Revolutionary times, newspapers maintained the
responsibility of reporting the events of conflict to the settlers within the developing
country. Most newspapers, however, favored the cause for independence. Thus, this
patriotic flare often caused embellishment of the truth from the battlefield, setting the
stage for early hostile relationships between the media and the military, and forming what
some would call a “liberal” press (Hammond, 1994). Ambrose Serle, an official charged
with monitoring the colonial press, wrote home to England in 1776: “One is astonished to
see avidity [newspapers]…are sought after, and how they are believed by the great Bulk
of the People” (as cited in Hammond, 1994, p. 2087). And although coming very early in
the new nation’s development, this epiphany would become the foundation for the
evolution of the news media and the public’s perception of events facing the nation.
Media scholars often contend that the military sees the press as part of its own
propagandistic apparatus during times of war. The news media often reflect public
opinion. In turn, public opinion often mirrors the opinions of the news media. Napoleon
had the belief that “three hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand
bayonets” (as cited in Hammond, 1994). It is no wonder, then, that early military
objectives included keeping on good terms with the news media. However, as time
progressed, the public’s perception of the media began to change, thus changing the
military’s standpoint toward the press. In more recent times, the public’s perception of
the press has evolved into a somewhat negative connotation.
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In order to fully understand the failing relationship between the press and the
military, it is important to examine this negative perception of the press by the public that
both democratic entities intend to serve. Steven R. Van Hook, a media and public
relations veteran, once wrote:
The history of the news media has been colorful...From the worst imaginable
abuses of press power to the highest standards of public service, the media have
played the full spectrum of hues and tones to catch the public’s eyes and ears.
(Hook, 1986, para. 1)
Hook’s comments adequately reflect public sentiment. The public has long raised
criticism about media intrusiveness, negativity, and bias (Center for Media and Public
Affairs, 1997). In a study conducted by the Center for Media and Public Affairs (1997), a
majority of respondents (52%) believed that the press abuses its First Amendment
freedoms rather than use them responsibly. When asked to compare the traits of
newspeople to those of other people, 42% described journalists as more arrogant, 31% as
more cynical, and 33% as less compassionate.
But the public’s negative perception of the press is not just geared toward the
journalist. Many people believe that media organizations as a whole are distancing
themselves from the public they serve. The media has emerged into a strong corporate
institution. Time magazine columnist Thomas Griffith wrote:
The news is that the press is at last beginning to shed its romantic image of itself
as the lone public defender pure of heart…To the public, the press is not David
among Goliaths; it has become one of the Goliaths...[The media] seems as
unreachable as the government or any big corporation. (Griffith, 1985, p. 57)
The public’s negative perception of the press remains strong during wartime. A
defining moment of such sentiment came when the Reagan administration completely
excluded the press from the Grenada invasion. The public overwhelmingly supported the
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administration’s decision for such restrictions. Thus, a military victory against the press
was apparent and, as this thesis will prove, would carry forth through subsequent wars.
Since our country’s inception, it has been involved is a series of conflict, both
internal and external. This thesis outlines the changes that have occurred in the
relationship between the military and the news media during latter 20th century conflicts,
and implications of these changes. In particular, this thesis will focus on five major U.S.
operations: Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Gulf War, and the beginnings of war in
Afghanistan. It will show the evolution of what should be termed as the media’s
“complaint discourse.” This discourse is characterized by a pronouncement of First
Amendment suppression and continually striving for unrestricted press access to the
battlefield.
Two guiding factors have contributed to the evolution of change among the
military and the news media. In order to begin an encompassing examination of such
change, these two factors must be investigated.
Public Perception After Vietnam
A second major factor contributing to the critical relationship between the
military and the media was the public’s lingering view of the overall press coverage of
the Vietnam War. The role of the media in Vietnam has been scrutinized by media
scholars for decades. Many critics have placed the blame for lack of popular support of
the war on the media’s coverage from the battlefield (Braestrup, 1978, 1985; Hallin,
1986). According to Lyndon Johnson, it was the one-sided, negative images the media
projected that caused the American people to turn against the military’s efforts in
Vietnam. In 1968, Richard Nixon further demonstrated this belief:
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The Vietnam War was complicated by factors that had never occurred in
America’s conduct of war…The American news media had come to dominate
domestic opinion about its purpose and conduct…The result was a serious
demoralization of the home front. (Nixon, 1978, p. 350)
And although many scholars would disagree with such sentiment (Knightley, 1975;
Sharkey, 1991; Wyatt, 1986), it still established the basis for future relations between the
military and the media during conflict, forever changing the way wars would be covered.
The lingering skepticism of military officials carried forth to subsequent wars.
Technology’s Influence on the Media-Military Relationship
But probably the most defining factor that has contributed to the changing
relationship between the media and the military is technology. Historically, evolving
media technology has resulted in increased press restrictions, causing the relationship to
become even more rigid. Veteran reporters can testify that the news media had easier
access to military operations prior to, and including, the Vietnam War. Newsmen often
accompanied troops in the battlefield, ultimately affecting the reporter as much as the
military personnel – both mentally and physically. The effects of war have been shared
by members of the press. World War II Correspondent Ernie Pyle wrote:
Writing is an exhausting and tearing thing. Most of the correspondents actually
worked like slaves. Especially was this true of the press association of men. The
result was that all of us who had been with the war for more than a year grew
befogged. We were grimy, mentally as well as physically. We’d drained our
emotions until they cringed from being called from hiding. We looked at bravery
and death and battlefield waste and new countries almost as blind men, seeing
only faintly and not really wanting to see at all. I am not writing this to make
heroes of correspondents, because only a few look upon themselves in any
dramatic light whatever. I am writing it to let you know that correspondents, too,
can get sick of war – and deadly tired. (as cited in James, 1991, p. 51)
Pyle’s words personify the feelings felt by early war correspondents. However, most of
these correspondents would have it no other way. Reporters got their story and informed
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the public about happenings on the battlefield, upholding their democratic duties.
However, as firearms became more powerful, the safety of war correspondents became
increasingly threatened. Throughout the 19th century, the accuracy and speed of weapons
increased, culminating with the invention of the machine gun. This made accompanying
troops on the battlefield even more deadly for journalists, and became a crucial factor in
the way modern wars would be reported. In fact, in the onslaught of press restrictions that
dominated the media-military relationship in the 1980s and 1990s, the safety of
newspeople became the most prominent Pentagon excuse for press exclusion.
Technology also provided a venue for immediacy in reporting. With the advent of
the steamship, the railroad, and the telegraph, news from the front traveled increasingly
faster, making military officials skeptical and nervous. So by the time the Vietnam War –
aptly called the “television war” (Arlen, 1982, p. 70) – ended, the relationship between
the military and the press was at an all-time low. In addition, when the United States
military invaded the island of Grenada in 1983, satellite transmission was in its infancy.
But in a matter of 10 years, the advances in technology were crucial in how
correspondents reported events. The ability to transmit pictures of wartime into living
rooms of the world had increased exponentially in the years leading up to the Persian
Gulf War. Walter Gantz wrote, “If Vietnam was the first television war, ‘Operation
Desert Storm’ was the first brought home by satellite, sometimes live and in living color”
(Gantz, 1993, p. 1). As television spectators, the American public watched the green glow
of Baghdad while bombs exploded key targets around the city. The Gulf War proved to
be an enormous media event, defining the use of satellite systems and new media outlets
such as the Cable News Network (CNN). During the first few hours of the operation in
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the Gulf, Americans and others around the world tuned to CNN as it provided live
coverage through a unique electronic hook-up to Baghdad. “For a period, it seemed as if
the world had turned to CNN,” wrote Gantz (Gantz, 1993, p. 1).
With each new technological advance came the public’s preference for new media
outlets. Television has emerged as the main source of news for the majority of the
American public. But, perhaps what is most disturbing to military officials about
television is its entertainment value. And unfortunately, television media have often been
criticized for conforming to this aspect of the medium. James Fallows, Washington editor
of The Atlantic Monthly, wrote, “Mainstream journalism has made the mistake of trying
to compete with the pure entertainment media – music, TV, celebrities, movies – on their
own terms. But this is a losing game” (Fallows, 1996, p. 244).
The shift in allegiance between television and newspapers by the public occurred
during the 1960’s – more specifically during the Vietnam War (Hallin, 1986). But for
some media scholars, this shift was not a welcomed venture. Leonard Downie, Jr. and
Robert Kaiser, both of the Washington Post, writes about the differences between
newspaper and television reporting:
Television and newspapers both perform vital public services, but they aren’t the
same services. Television brings great events to the public, allows us all to
participate vicariously in the making of history…Newspapers, at least the better
ones, are much more ambitious. Their public service is to bring a rich, detailed
account of yesterday in the world to their readers every day, an account that
enables citizens to remain in touch with numerous aspects of contemporary life in
their community, country and world. (Downie & Kaiser, 2002, pp. 66-67)
What the two authors concede is the immediacy of television does not allow for a
thorough examination of events, unlike the reporting style of television. It is this
immediacy and impact of the images of television that causes the public to prefer the
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medium (Gitlin, 2001). But at the same time, these same aspects appear to cause a kink in
the relationship between the military and the media.
The technological advancements is both reporting and combat techniques have
caused an overall disappearance of the nostalgic war coverage that American
correspondents once prospered from, and still yearn for today. And although the
complaint discourse of reporters continues to strengthen, the possibility of returning to
the journalists’ vision of unrestricted press access is all but lost due to such
advancements.
Historical Perspectives
Chapters 2-7 provide the historical framework for this thesis, chronicling the
media’s “complaint discourse” and how it strengthened after each subsequent war.
Chapter 2 explores the evolution of change in the relationship between the military and
the media, spanning nearly two centuries of American history. It provides a brief
overview of changes from the Revolutionary period to the conflict in Korea. The chapter
gives examples of changing technology that contributed to the change and reflects upon
public opinion during these eras.
Chapter 3 focuses on the Vietnam War and how it ultimately changed the way
future wars would be presented by the media. Shrouded by claims of false reports by
government officials and pessimism and bias from the media, this war provides the most
enduring evidence of why restrictions are placed on the press and why the relationship
between the two entities continue to decline. The chapter discusses the television media’s
role in covering the events of the conflict and defines the implications of such reporting,
both on the media profession and military procedures. It explores the erosion of trust
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between the military and the media and how this mistrust factor ultimately carried over to
future operations. It is the nostalgic atmosphere of reporting the Vietnam War that
reporters today still attempt to grasp on to.
Chapter 4 discusses “Operation Urgent Fury” in Grenada in 1983, in which the
American press was excluded entirely from the initial mission. Although this was the first
time the military placed such restrictions on the media, it set precedence in the way future
wars would be covered (Sharkey, 1991; Braestrup, 1985; Diederich, 1984). To make
matters worse for the American media, the American public was supportive of the
Pentagon’s restrictions, allowing future limitations to be set forth without public outcries.
This chapter also explores the media’s concern about receiving only government-filtered
information as opposed to reporting first-hand accounts. In addition, the chapter delves
into conditions of the Sidle Report – a series of recommendations set forth to improve the
military-media relationship. Chapter 4 also explores the implementation of the national
press pool system and discusses the ramifications of such system.
Chapter 5 presents the events of “Operation Urgent Fury” in Panama in 1989. The
conflict in Panama became a test of the recommendations set forth by the Sidle Report,
including the creation of the national press pool system. The chapter discusses several
physical and technical obstacles reporters had to face in reporting the conflict as well as
the military’s lack of accommodation to the correspondents regarding these obstacles.
From a journalistic standpoint, the deployment of the press pool in Panama was a dismal
failure. This chapter examines new stipulations agreed upon by both the media and the
military to improve reporting standards during later wars.
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Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the relationship between the military and the
media during the Persian Gulf War. It chronicles the press’ struggle with access to the
front lines, as well as the military’s refusal to such access. The implications of such press
restrictions are also discussed, both from a media and military standpoint. Technology
played an enormous role in the reporting of the Gulf War. This chapter discusses the
media’s role in the conflict as a result of technological advances. In particular, chapter 6
takes an in-depth look at the Cable News Network and its presence during the conflict
and how it changed the face of war reporting.
Chapter 7 is an analysis of Operations “Enduring Freedom” and “Anaconda” in
Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002. The war in Afghanistan opened a new scope for
journalists. And although referred to as an unconventional war, the war in Afghanistan
produced a juxtaposition of recent war coverage and pre-Vietnam reporting. As an
example, this chapter discusses the deployment of both the national press pool system
and an embedded press system that were both implemented during the conflict. Kathleen
Kirby wrote:
Indeed, our nation’s war against terrorism – a war defense secretary Donald
Rumsfeld has characterized as “a war like none other our nation has faced” – has
rekindled conflicts between the news media and the administration over press
freedom and national security. Those tensions are further complicated by a surge
in patriotism following the horrific attacks on American soil, the necessarily
covert nature of the resulting military operations, and the advances in technology
that enable news to travel around the world with lightening speed. (Kirby, 2001,
para. 2)
Covering a “war like none other our nation has faced” resulted in the kind of reporting
that the journalistic professional had never faced. This chapter discusses not only this
aspect but also the Pentagon’s attempt to find middle ground in satisfying the media’s
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need to report on military operations. This chapter also analyzes media criticism in
dealing with terrorist activities and its conformation to public sentiment.
The underlying theoretical perspective for this research is that technology has
changed the face of war reporting so dramatically that the possibility of returning to
journalists’ utopian vision of unlimited press access to the battlefield is unattainable.
Chapter 8 discusses the methodology used in this research, including the overall use of
content analysis as a research method. In particular, two specific time periods – January
31 – February 10, 1968 and October 8 – 18, 2001 – are sampled using The New York
Times as the primary text.
This thesis sets out to answer three primary research questions to test the validity
of reporters’ complaints about press suppression since the Vietnam era. These questions
were developed using the discourse analysis of previous researchers presented in the first
seven chapters. The research questions are as follows:
Research Question 1: How have government restrictions placed on the press after
the Vietnam War affected the way reporters use first-hand accounts in their
coverage of conflict?
Research Question 2: In the same regards, how have the press restrictions affected
the way photographs are obtained during conflict?
Research Question 3: Does the published photo’s source determine the sentiment
portrayed within the photograph?
The quantitative results presented in Chapter 9 attempts to answer these three questions.
Yet it is the qualitative results intertwined throughout the chapter that will prove the




THE EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT:
REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD TO KOREA
In upholding the democratic idea, war is inevitable. The United States military has
seen action in all parts of the globe and in all types of landscapes – mountains, deserts,
jungles, and caves. And for the most part, the American media have been at the forefront
of these domains, accompanying troops and informing the public of occurrences.
Nathaniel Lande writes, “Typewriter patriots, equipped with telegraphs, radio
microphones, or satellite links, have been the conduit for a public eager to imagine and
feel every musket fire and missile blast from Lexington to Baghdad” (Lande, 1998, p. xi).
The press’ role has evolved over the years. The media have fostered nationalism,
offered skepticism, supported patriotism, questioned judgment, and formed and reflected
public opinion. But above all, the press’ main responsibility was to inform. And in
attempting to do so, conflict often arises. James Monroe observed that the concept of a
free press was so central to the formation of our American democracy that there was “not
one recorded objection” to the idea when the Bill of Rights was framed (Hammond,
1994, p. 2085).  So if this ideal was central to the successful creation of our country, why
has the military been the key proponent in obstructing this inherent right? Perhaps
criticism of military officials and campaigns, impending censorship restraints, and
security infractions alluded to problems between the two entities. Although problems
existed, the relationship seemed to be fairly neutral through almost two centuries of our
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nation’s history. This chapter attempts to outline the many changes in the relationship
between the military and the media from the country’s inception up to the Vietnam era. In
order to understand where this relationship is now, it is imperative to revisit the past.
The Revolutionary Press
The war for independence, like many subsequent wars, was often referred to as a
public opinion war. It was fought that way on the battlefield, and fought that way in print.
Newspapers of the time were often filled with embellishments and passionate accounts
more than factual reports. Oftentimes, the reports and commentaries reflected the opinion
of the newspaper’s publisher. However, General Washington and his commanders used
the press – along with churches, town meetings, and other entities of the civilian
community – to carry forth his efforts and his objectives. Many newspapers enjoyed wide
circulation throughout the colonies. For example, the Connecticut Courant had 8,000
readers in 1778 (Hammond, 1994, p. 2087). And although he realized that the press rarely
corrected blatant mistakes within their pages, Washington understood the public scope of
newspapers and used the news media to further the cause for independence (Hammond,
1994, p. 2087).
The Revolutionary War did not have war correspondents, per se. News from the
front initially arrived as unconfirmed rumors. Many newspapers relied on letters from
stringers in the battlefield. If a battle was not covered by these so-called stringers, the
newspaper often printed reports submitted by commanding officers. Regardless of the
way the news was disseminated, it was usually not timely. Weeks often passed before
battles were written about.
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Although the Revolutionary Press is often accused of providing false information
to the people of the colonies, Thomas Jefferson was one of the unfaltering defenders of a
free press. In a letter to Colonial Edward Carrington on January 16, 1787, Jefferson
wrote:
The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first
object should be to keep that right; and if it were left up to me to decide
whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers
without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.
(Boyd, 1950, pp. 48-49)
And with these sentiments, the democratic importance of the American
newspaper was understood.
Wars of Expansion: The War of 1812 and Mexican War
With the purchase of the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803, the
growing United States secured land that would be marked by cash crop cultivation
and steamship traffic. Only three decades after the American Revolution, the
population of the United States had more than doubled. True commercialization
was occurring as the expansion of the nation continued. But with this expansion
of commerce, both territorial and oceanic, conflict between the British Empire in
Canada and the United States erupted into the War of 1812. And although the war
was small and usually fought on distant fronts, the news media was active in
covering the war.
Poor communications between the press and the military hindered
attempts to report the war to the public. Just like Revolutionary War reporting,
editors relied mostly on letters sent by eye witnesses. These letters, however,
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often reached American soil days or weeks after battles took place. And in any
case, the news that reached the editors’ desks was often plagued with inaccuracies
and contradictory statements. During the War of 1812, much of what was printed
was editorial commentary. This commentary was filtered with sarcasm and
mudslinging – adapted from journalistic standards of the time.
Lande writes, “The War of 1812 does not receive much attention from
today’s historians, but except for the Civil War, it was perhaps the most hotly
debated conflict in which the country has ever been involved in…Americans were
bitterly divided by political party loyalties, economic considerations, religious
views or patriotic and national sentiment” (Lande, 1998, p. 46). And so,
journalism of this era often contained much propaganda and attempted to reflect
public opinion – a reflection that was often contradictory of journalism ethics,
filled with inaccuracies, narratives, and self-political views. Thus, the
government’s view of the press held a negative connotation.
And during the years that followed the War of 1812, relations between the
military and the media continued to diminish. As the United States became more
and more commercialized, many entrepreneurs discovered that money could be
made in the newspaper business. The advancement of nineteenth century
technology – the magnetic telegraph, the steamship, and the railroad – made it
possible to disseminate news rapidly. It was such advancements that would
eventually contribute to much strife between the media and the military. The
17
Mexican War was the first war that allowed such advancements to be utilized in
reporting.
Unlike previous wars, the wide use of the telegraph allowed the American
people to follow the events of the Mexican War very closely, and in a somewhat
timely fashion. Reporters accompanied troops and wrote dispatches from the
battlefield. In some cases, army officers doubled as reporters as well. In fact,
many filed their reports with the newspapers before completing any reports for
their superior officers (Lande, 1998).
Although the Mexican War was short, some notable firsts in American
journalism was accomplished. Competition was paramount for newspapers of the
era. Therefore, the need for fast news was integrated into the everyday operations
of the news media. Competing papers formed a cooperative arrangement that
relayed information by steamboat to New Orleans, where it was quickly
telegraphed to media outlets throughout the United States. Some newspapers,
such as the American Star, American Eagle, and Tampico Sentinel, printed single-
page news sheets directly from the battlefield (Lande, 1998).
News traveled more quickly than in any previous wars, contributing to the
competitive nature of the newspapers – a concern for officers of the American
military. Many newspapers went to great expense to make sure their readership
received the news of the war first. The New York Herald kept a vessel at sea that
would intercept news from steamships and then rushed to the docks where
typesetters awaited. The New Orleans Picayune hired a typesetter aboard its ship
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so that reports could be sent immediately to the awaiting press. Newspapers often
printed a special edition if the news proved to be important. These “Extras” were
distributed by newsboys immediately following printing. At times, newspapers
printed up to four editions a day and often sold out of each one. According to
Lande (1998), the Mexican War ultimately allowed the penny press to flourish.
Also unlike many previous wars, coverage of the war was marked by
accuracy, relying on eyewitness reports from the front. Reports from the field
were given top printing priority. The Baltimore Sun showed the aggressiveness of
war reporting during the Mexican War. In April 1847, a pony express rider
brought news that Veracruz had fallen – a critical victory in the war effort. Aware
that his rider was a day ahead of the War Department’s courier, the Sun’s
publisher notified President Polk of the news. It was the first word of victory to
reach the White House. Historian Robert Henry wrote that the Mexican War was
“the first war in history to be adequately and comprehensively reported in the
daily press” (Lande, 1998, p. 52).
The Civil War Press
Before the onslaught of the American Civil War, more than 50,000 miles
of telegraph wire spanned the United States, thus giving reporters a reliable,
technological means to cover the war. This extensive network of telegraph wire
allowed reporters to transmit dispatches straight from the front lines.
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Competition among newspapers once again flourished during the Civil
War. Oftentimes, the first reports were rewarded with $25 bonuses. However,
editors exhibited very little regard for accuracy if it meant that a competitor might
publish the story first. At times, fictitious news stories were the result of such
heralded rewards. Civil War reporter Henry Villard, commented, “To print the
first, however incorrect and incomplete intelligence was the height of their
ambition, and it often happened to correspondents that, instead of receiving credit
for trustworthiness, they were censured for tardiness” (Villard, 1861). And
although the reporting styles of the Civil War might not have been entirely
accurate, it was a substantial improvement over past decades of war. The
newspapers of the 1860s printed news whether it was good or bad. During the
war, correspondents began to emerge as an individual entity on the battlefield.
Advancements in war reporting changed the face of war for the American
public. With the advent of the camera, Civil War photographers conveyed the
brutality of battle and diminished the romantic view of war once thought of by the
citizens of the nation. And in turn, a new breed of journalism took shape. The
military could no longer hide the tragedy and grim details of the battle field from
the photojournalists. And new connotations of war were introduced into the
homes of the American people. In 1961 – 100 years after the Civil War – Robert
Penn reflected on such connotations:
When the smoke of battle had cleared away, the American was apt to see
that there had been a bloody collision between two absolute and
uncompromising views of how society should be operated. Looking about
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him at the carnage, he was likely to say that he had had enough of such
absolutes, and to decide never to permit anything like them again.
(Warren, 1961, p. 83)
But for the military, a continuing struggle with the press emerged. Many
newspaper correspondents regularly released sensitive information in their
dispatches. It was documented that General Robert E. Lee read northern
newspapers avidly throughout the war to learn of the Northern army’s movements
and objectives. Competition was too intense, and the news media and the military
could not find common ground as to what kind of information should be withheld.
Eventually, the War Department imposed censorship after the First Battle of Bull
Run. Northern commanders considered limiting press access to operations in the
field. Lincoln suppressed many newspapers across the country for sedition.
General Sherman often questioned the government’s willingness to allow
newsmen to accompany troops into battle. But, the hunger of the divided
American people for the news on the front stopped any inclination of limiting
press access. During the Civil War, newspaper circulation in New York City
alone increased as much as five times whenever word was announced about a
major battle. Troops themselves relied on newspapers to deliver news from other
fronts. Hammond remarked:
During a lull in the Battle of Cedar Creek in October 1864, observers later
remarked, the first thing soldiers did all along the line was to sit down,
boil coffee, and pull out old issues of whatever newspapers they had at
hand in an attempt to make some sense of the holocaust that had
descended upon them. (Hammond, 1994, p. 2090)
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And although the relationship between the press and military was not an amiable
one at the time, both ultimately needed each other during the war. But as the war
continued, good reporters were promoted, retired, or killed. In turn, second-rate
reporters came to dominate the scene – reporters that Villard said were more fit
“to drive cattle than to write for newspapers” (Villard, 1861).
But several correspondents, such as Villard, emerged as influential
individuals in war reporting. The New York Tribune correspondent George
Smalley reported on the Battle of Antietam in 1862, supplying the first accurate
account received by President Lincoln of what occurred during what is considered
the bloodiest single day of the Civil War. This report is still considered one of the
greatest pieces of writing to come out of the war, representing the utmost
accuracy and clarity.
War During the “Yellow Age of Journalism”
Following the Civil War, relations between the press and the military
remained unstable. Although a reporter died with General Custer at the Battle of
Little Big Horn in 1876, most reporters who accompanied military operations
were not highly regarded among officers. And as the inception of yellow
journalism occurred in the 1890s, little was done to improve the relationship.
When the Spanish-American War began in 1898, journalism was marked
by sensationalistic coverage. And although objectivity is a key requirment among
today’s reporters, most often it was cast aside in favor of a sensational report.
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Before fighting even erupted, William Randolph Hurst, publisher of the New
York Journal, sent artist Frederic Remington to Cuba to sketch any skirmishes he
came upon. Using a telegraph, Remington wrote to Hearst, “Everything quiet. No
trouble here. There will be no war. I wish to return.” And the reply from Hurst
lives on in journalistic history: “Please remain. You furnish the pictures and I will
furnish the war” (Lande, 1998, p. 127). And this practice adopted by Hearst
would continue when the United States eventually declared war on Spain.
The government did attempt to impose censorship on the press at the time
of the Spanish-American War. However, the large number of reporters that
arrived to chronicle the war efforts made the process difficult to enforce. The
press’ criticism of military officers as well as reports on the poor training of
troops, lack of food, and disease that inflicted the troops on a daily basis, caused
military officials to view the press in a negative way. General William R. Shafter,
the commander of U.S. expeditionary force to Cuba, reflected this attitude. When
the New York Herald reporter Richard Harding Davis requested to go ashore with
the first wave of troops at Daiquiri, Shafter reacted by saying, “I don’t give a
damn who you are. I’ll treat you all alike” (Hammond, 1994, p. 2092). This
attitude would carry over into subsequent wars.
The Development of Modern War Reporting: Two World Wars
When preparations began for the United States’ involvement in World
War I, Secretary of War Newton Baker appointed Major Douglas MacArthur as a
mediator between the war department and the increasing number of journalists
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who reported on the activities of the department. By issuing press releases and
granting interviews, MacArthur ultimately helped the media and the American
public understand the purpose for U.S. involvement in the first World War – thus
establishing the need for a public relations office during war time.
Prior to U.S. involvement in the war, both the British and French
governments excluded journalists from the battlefield completely. Lloyd George,
British Prime Minister, told the editor of the Manchester Guardian, “If the people
really knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow. But of course they don’t know
and can’t know” (Hammond, 1994, p. 2094).
However, when the United States entered the war, the military allowed
reporters greater freedom to accompany the troops. The competition of the
newspapers during the era had increased exponentially. And although
commanders attempted to limit the number of reporters allowed on the front, so
many reporters arrived that a possible limitation was not feasible. At one point
during the war, 411 correspondents were present.
The American military was very cautious in handling the press. Reporters
who wished to become regular correspondents during the war had to adhere to a
lengthy process of accreditation. This process included making an appearance
before the secretary of war, submitting a $10,000 bond to assure proper conduct
in the field, and taking an oath to uphold truth. And even though freedom of the
press epitomizes democratic principles, censors were put into place to monitor the
news from the front. The censors allowed general facts about the war to be
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reported, but often tried to soften the hideous details of some battles. The
reporters had little choice but to cooperate with the censors, complying with the
rules in an effort to establish a working relationship. World War I reporter
Raymond Tompkins wrote:
The censorship irked them and they hated it at first, but gradually they
grew used to it and wrote what they could, working up all the “human
interest stuff” available and learning quickly that the censors loved it and
almost invariably passed it – provided it said nothing about the drinking,
stealing and rugged amours of the soldat Americain (Hammond, 1994, p.
2096).
And although the censors were quick in attempts to soften the effects of bad news,
the public did not seem to mind. Military managers were quick to brush the press
aside in matters of war, and correspondents found it difficult to get a good story.
In 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, “When a nation is at war, many
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be tolerated so long as men fight” (Teeter, 1998, p. 21).
This statement would ultimately personify the feelings the military had in relation
to the press – sentiments that would be carried forth in subsequent wars.
In the years between the two world wars, the military gave an abundance
of thought as to what its relationship with the press should be. The U.S. Army set
precedence in establishing a working relationship with the press. Its press
relations section became the chief informant between the public and the press
about the army’s objectives.
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When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, a rare
cooperation between the military and the press occurred. Knowing that
democracies could not successfully wage a war without popular support, both
entities worked together to obtain success. Officials at all levels of the military
worked to keep the press informed about occurrences without alerting the enemy
about pertinent information. Editors and publishers readily cooperated with the
military by working closely with the director of censorship Byron Price in
establishing a voluntary “Code of Wartime Practices.” The stipulations of this
code defined the categories of information of use to an enemy. Correspondents
would not report on troop movements, descriptions of planned operations,
shipping schedules, or facts and figures on the Allies’ order of battle. In October
1942, Price delivered a speech at the New York Times forum on “News
Dissemination in Wartime, stating:
Censorship is a necessary evil of wartime. We have known it in some form
during every war in our history. In present time, when war is all-out and
globe-encircling, censorship is a vital weapon. Its function is to attack the
communications of the enemy, to hamper him on every front and every
flank, to keep from him vital information of our own war effort and to
gather such information as may be possible about his plans and purposes.
Surely it cannot be disputed that this in not only useful but an
indispensable part of total warfare such as we know today. (Price, 1942, p.
158)
And although in the same speech he says, “This is a war for freedom, and to
mention freedom and censorship in the same breath might appear a contradiction
of terms,” (Price, 1942, p. 158) the press openly accepted the guidelines set forth
by the Office of Censorship.
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Just prior to World War II, the radio had become a supreme prime means
of transmitting news. Civilians depended on the radio broadcasts from Europe as
their means of information. In addition, hundreds of newspaper correspondents
followed troops throughout the European theater. A special uniform was even
developed for American reporters on the front lines.
Although in the beginning of the war a certain cooperation existed, as the
conflict progressed, this cooperation soon declined. Correspondents complained
that the navy withheld information about the battles of Midway and the Coral Sea
too long to simply satisfy proper security measures. During the North African
campaign (1942-1943), many news stories never reached their destinations or
reached it too late. Similarly, it took 28 hours for the first combat reports about
the Invasion of Normandy to reach newspapers in the United States.
But overall, despite some criticism by members of the press, enough
information was made available for the satisfaction of most reporters. In working
closely with members of the media, some trusted correspondents in North Africa
received a month’s warning in advance of the invasion of Sicily. In the same
respects, a pool of four reporters who accompanied General Eisenhower learned
the planned date, time, and location of the Normandy invasion well in advance.
William L. Laurence, the science reporter for the New York Times, received
pertinent information about the Manhattan Project five months prior to the atomic
bomb attacks on Japan.
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Relations between the press and the military during World War II were
deemed amicable. Very few criticisms from either side emerged. However, some
outspoken critics conveyed their thoughts about the use of censors during
wartime. In his novel Once There Was a War, author John Steinbeck believed the
press cooperated so well with the censors that it often isolated the public from the
war’s reality. Journalist Philip Knightley suggested that the public was told
exactly what the government wanted them to hear and nothing else. Such
criticism would arise again in future wars and set the stage for a new age of war
reporting.
The Korean War
Perhaps the greatest struggle between the press and the military occurred
during the Korean conflict. Riding on the fact that the American public was not in
favor of the war, the writings of the press often reflected public opinion.
Reporting was often characterized by criticism of the campaign.
MacArthur, the U.S. commander in Japan at the time, imposed a system of
voluntary guidelines for reporters that allowed them to say what they wanted.
However, the stipulations made them personally responsible for violations of
security. The problematic details of these guidelines included the fact that many
members of the military were uncertain as to what constituted a security violation.
And because of extreme competition among media outlets, the problems between
the military and press intensified. Basically, what one reporter would consider a
security violation, another would often print. Loose interpretations of security
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measures occurred frequently. Revelations of security information occurred
almost on a daily basis. One correspondent even revealed the impending landing
at Inchon in September 1950 nearly 10 hours in advance. Because of such
breaches in security, MacArthur was forced to implement censorship during the
war.
Although the censors were able to reduce security violations, they could
not halt them completely. No provisions were ever made to stop reporters from
outside the area from revealing security information. In fact, on June 18, 1951,
Newsweek published a detailed map revealing the order of battle for MacArthur’s
troops. The same infraction occurred  in October when the magazine revealed the
battle order for the entire Eighth Army.
With the few aforementioned exceptions, the military and the press did
work well together during the Korean War. Reporters rarely complained about the
censors; and the censors did a fairly good job informing the press. The few
inevitable mistakes did not overshadow the somewhat harmonious relationship
between the press and the military. However, detrimental mistakes would change
this relationship during the next major conflict – the Vietnam War.
Conclusion
It is important to understand that through the first two centuries of our
nation’s existence, the relationship between the press and military spouted some
conflicts. But overall, they worked together in the protection of democracy.
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Certain restrictions on the press were made, and for the most part, were followed
by press corps members. But as technology changed, and war efforts became
more controversial, the positive relationship reached its apex, and the rapid
decline of a positive relationship occurred almost immediately. It is this decline
that affected the overall reporting of subsequent operations: Vietnam, Grenada,
Panama, the Gulf War, and Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER 3
THE VIETNAM WAR: FORMING MEDIA NOSTALGIA
The war in Vietnam divided our nation’s people, government, and democratic
institutions. Ultimate defeat in Vietnam carried with it even more divisibility. But at the
heart of this defeat and disillusionment came harsh criticism of the media by the military.
Even more divisive has been the debate as to the media’s role in the latter parts of the
conflict. For the most part, the relationship between the media and the military remained
manageable at the end of the Korean War (Lande, 1998; Hammond, 1994). The two
institutions continued to work together to fulfill a democratic destiny. But it has been
argued that the turning point in the detrimental relationship between the military and the
press occurred during the Vietnam conflict (Braestrup, 1985; Sharkey, 1991; Hammond,
1998) .
The Vietnam War has often been described as America’s “television war” (Arlen,
1982). Because this was the first war to stream into the living rooms of concerned
citizens, Americans saw the conflict first hand. And although the once romantic view of
war had long since diminished, the reality had never been seen so vividly. Previously, the
public relied on newspapers to deliver the somewhat delayed news of conflict. But
Vietnam was entirely different. The news media – specifically the television news media
– helped establish public opinion by the simple pictures that came from the front lines
Goodnow, 1968; Knightley, 1975, Mandelbaum, 1982). The crucial aspect of a televised
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war is impact. Conflict was not glamorized, but rather emotionally and brutally depicted.
Lyndon Johnson explained the impact of the media’s presence in Vietnam:
As I sat in my office last evening waiting to speak, I thought of the many times
each week when television brings the war into the American home. No one can
say exactly what effect those vivid scenes have on American opinion. Historians
must only guess at the effect that television would have had during earlier
conflicts on the future of this Nation. (Mandelbaum, 1982, p. 157)
Johnson’s idea is very clear. It is his assumption that if previous wars had been televised,
the United States might not have persevered in fighting them. This sentiment is reflected
in the writings of media and military scholars alike. One central question asked after the
conflict was, “Did the press lose the war in Vietnam?” It is apparent that the media had a
profound effect on public opinion during the course of the war. And perhaps losing the
support of the American people ultimately caused the defeat in Vietnam. As previously
referenced, the success of any war fought by a democracy depends on the support of the
people.
In order to understand the current relationship between the military and the media,
one must revisit the past – particularly Vietnam. Memories of Vietnam have affected
every successive U.S. military operation. The war became the turning point in the poor
relationship between the two institutions. And media scholars often set the Tet offensive
in 1968 as the eventual change in the relationship. Shifts toward pessimism, criticism,
and regret were apparent in the media’s coverage after the Tet offensive. However, the
Vietnam War not only changed the military’s perception of the press, but it also changed
the public’s perception as well. This chapter attempts to answer questions of blame as
well as show the evolutionary change in perception of the media by both the public and
the miltary.
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Television: The Preferred Medium
In order to understand the changing public and military perception of the press
during the Vietnam conflict, it is important to look at the evolution of television news
coverage during the period. Just as in previous wars – and subsequent wars – evolving
technology often causes strife between the media and the military. During the Vietnam
era, it is television that persists as the technological advance in war reporting. It can be
argued that this advancement forever changed the face of war and war reporting
Mandelbaum, 1982; Hallin, 1986; James 1991). Television should be perceived as a
decisive influence on public opinion during this time. A series of surveys conducted by
the Roper Organization for Television Information in 1964 showed that for the first time
in history, more people received most of their news from television. With multiple
responses permitted, 58% of respondents said television was their main source of news;
56% said newspapers; 26% said radio; and 8% said magazines (Hallin, 1986, p. 106). In
fact, by 1972 – three years prior to the pull-out of American troops in Vietnam – TV led
newspapers 64% to 50%. Many scholars have attributed this to two factors: 1) the
personal nature of the medium and 2) the presence of pictures (Hallin, 1986, Gitlin,
2001). Both factors contribute to the main focus of television in war coverage – the
definitive impact of the medium.
Daniel Hallin, who provided extensive research into Vietnam and the press,
concluded that the effectiveness television had on the public’s perception of the war
boiled down to two main principles. First, because it is a visual medium, television shows
the raw horror of war in a way print media could not Although magazines such as Life,
Time and Newsweek vividly portrayed life on the front through their photos, the visual
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aspect of television’s moving pictures infiltrated America’s homes. Second, television
seemed to focus on the negative more than its print counterpart. This biased reporting has
been reiterated by media scholars since the end of the Vietnam War. And it is this biased
reporting that would set precedence for future war coverage.
The United States troops were never actually defeated militarily, but the images
that streamed into America’s homes via television convinced the public that the war was
not winnable. Critics accuse the television media of presenting a one-sided image that
was detrimental to United States foreign policy and would eventually turn the America
public away from support of the war. To critics and national leaders, it was the media that
determined the outcome of the war, not the military. Richard Nixon explained:
The Vietnam War was complicated by factors that had never before occurred in
America’s conduct of war…The American news media had come to dominate
domestic opinion about its purpose and conduct…The result was a serious
demoralization of the home front. (as cited in Bindas, 1990, p. 63)
This was not always the case, however. Both Hallin (1986) and William Hammond
(1988, 1998), senior historian with the U.S. Army’s Center of Military History,
concluded that the media were accurate and supportive of the United States involvement
in South Vietnam at the beginning of the war. However, when popular consensus
changed in regards to the war, television’s negative portrayals began to occur. Thus, the
relationship between the media and the military began to fail quickly.
One may argue that the difference between the Vietnam War and other previous
wars lay in the perception of the conflict, not overall operations or military conduct. And
this perception lies in the advent of television. Television was the single most influential
factor that changed the opinions of not only the public, but many government officials.
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Vice President Hubert Humphrey summed up American sentiment about the “living room
war”:
…This is the first war in this nation’s history that has been fought on television
where the actors are real. Where, in the quiet of your living room of your home,
or your dormitory, or wherever you may be, these cruel, ugly, dirty facts of life
and death in war and pain and suffering come right to you; and it isn’t Hollywood
acting. I’ve had letters from mothers that have seen their boys shot down in
battle… (Goodnow, 1969, p. 141)
Good Relations Go Bad
Unlike the Korean War, Vietnam began with the news media and the military on
relatively good terms. As a result, coverage of the conflict was free of virtually any kind
of censorship. Like in previous conflicts, a system of voluntary guidelines by the press
that withheld information from the enemy was instituted in the coverage of the war. In
fact, many media scholars believe that Vietnam was the most openly reported war of
modern times. For the most part, correspondents  were able to go where they pleased and
describe the war as they saw fit. The military went to great lengths to provide
transportation, meals, shelter, and abundant briefings to the U.S. press corps. Military
commanders illustrated great confidence in the media as a whole. In turn, the media
portrayed the American soldier and his commander positively.
Early press coverage of the United States involvement in Vietnam showed
indications of criticism, however. In 1958, Bernard Fall wrote in The Nation that “the
disappointment is real and growing” (Fall, 1958, p. 491) concerning South Vietnam and
its leadership. But The Nation was not the only periodical press that criticized early
involvement. Beginning with South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem’s claim to power
in 1955 through the attempted coup in November 1960, the periodical press focused on
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the failures of the South Vietnamese leader and questioned U.S. foreign aid. These early
strains would only broaden as America was pulled into what many military analysts
termed an unwinnable war.
 Early media restrictions during the conflict were adopted to prevent “frivolous,
thoughtless criticism” of the South Vietnamese government (Hammond, 1988, p. 15).
These restrictions were outlined in Cable 1006, a directive from the U.S. Information
Agency, the State Department and the Defense Department. The directive placed
restrictions on the press in 1962 – three years before U.S. combat forces were sent to
South Vietnam. The directive ordered military officials to make certain that journalists
did not accompany military operations that might result in news stories that were
unfavorable toward U.S. policy. The edict stated that efforts must be made to emphasize
the South Vietnamese role in the war, mainly because “it is not…in our interest…to have
stories indicating that Americans are leading and directing combat missions against the
Viet Cong” (Hammond, 1988, p. 15). Cable 1006 certainly challenged the credibility of
the government in the eyes of the news media. Early reporters understood the
implications of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, but were unable to deliver the full story to
the American people.
Another prime restriction that harmed this credibility involved the State
Department and Pentagon orders that prohibited military briefers from talking about
South Vietnamese matters unless that information was cleared by the government of
South Vietnam. The erosion of trust culminated as the White House and Pentagon made a
decision to conceal the extent of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.
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Early correspondents were outraged at the restrictions on information. Homer
Bigart, a New York Times correspondent, wrote that American officials who criticized the
South Vietnamese government were “tracked down” and ordered not to talk with
journalists. In addition, he said that “correspondents who send gloomy dispatches are apt
to be upbraided for lack of patriotism” (Bigart, 1962, p. 1A).
During the early years, the relationship between the military and the media
reached a low point after the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963. In this battle, South
Vietnamese forces, accompanied by U.S. advisors, surrounded a company of Viet Cong.
However, due to numerous mistakes, the enemy was allowed to escape. Losses to the
South Vietnamese occurred and three U.S. advisors were killed. When stories broke
about the incident, General Paul D. Harkins, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam,
attempted to offer an optimistic account of the attack calling the Ap Bac battle a victory.
Many journalists were convinced that military spokesmen were continually lying to them.
Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford said U.S. officials made a severe error in dismissing
journalists’ stories during this period:
One area we failed to investigate during those early years of the American
buildup was the growing gap between the optimistic reports of progress that were
coming in through the official chain of command and the increasingly skeptical
reporting by some of the journalists covering the war…Even though those
skeptical reports were based in part on the views of many junior American
officers serving as advisers to the South Vietnamese Army, the Administration
viewed the reports as a public-relations nuisance rather than as something that
needed to be looked at carefully…It was a serious oversight on our part. (Clifford,
1991, p. 46)
Some government officials placed the blame on such restrictions on the South
Vietnamese government, which did not “understand the free American press” (Hilsman,
1963, p. 389). Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, said
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that information policies of the United States dictated that it is “essential that the
American people have available the fullest possible picture of what is happening in
Vietnam and our role there…reporters should be given the widest possible access to news
and information on Vietnam” (Hilsman, 1963, p. 388).
In early 1964, less than a year after Hilsman’s comments, the American people, as
well as members of Congress, were exposed to the role of the United States’ military in
Vietnam. Air Force Captain Edwin Gerald Shank wrote numerous letters to family
members about the war. The family released the letters to the Indianapolis News. What
was printed was an epiphany as to how the government had misled the public in the early
stages of the war. Shank wrote:
What gets me the most is that they won’t tell you people what we do over here. I
bet you that anyone you talk to does not know that American pilots fight this war.
We – me and my buddies – do everything. The Vietnamese “students” we have on
board are airmen basics. The only reason they are on board is in case we crash
there is one American “adviser” and one Vietnamese “student.” They’re stupid,
ignorant, sacrificial lambs, and…a menace to have on board. (Hammond, 1988, p.
76)
In response, relatives of U.S. soldiers killed in South Vietnam bought a full-page ad in
the Washington Star that listed the names of 127 Americans killed in the conflict since
1961. The ad also charged the Defense Department with concealing many other
casualties. Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine commented in 1964 that “there is a
genuine need, a desperate need, for the American people to be told the truth of the
Vietnamese war. They are not getting the facts from their government” (Hammond, 1988,
p. 77).
In attempts to find the truth about the United States’ role in Vietnam, many
reporters filed detailed reports about troop deployments and operations. As the U.S. role
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in Vietnam escalated, the Johnson administration considered formal military censorship
to halt such reports. However, after many months of debates, a formal system of press
censorship was rejected. For the most part, journalists had an excellent record of
protecting national security. In addition, military scholars point out that some officers
were uncomfortable with imposing censorship because Congress had not formally
declared war. For some Congressional members, imposing censorship could turn public
opinion against the administration because it ultimately violated democratic values.
Colonel Summers emphasized this opinion by stating:
Imposition of total censorship would not only jeopardize the very basis of
American society but would also sever the link between the American people and
their military. The ultimate price could well be higher than any advantages that
might accrue through improved U.S. strategic security. (Summers, 1984, p. 255)
It is the inherent right of the news media to criticize. Early reporting in Vietnam
was shrouded by questions of the government’s misleading of the media and the public.
And although some called for censorship, Vietnam remained an open book for reporters.
It was this openness that would lead to a shift in the relationship between the media and
the military. And it was the early optimistic picture the government conveyed that would
ultimately cause the shift in the way the war was reported. The press showed a definitive
shifted from an informational source to a pessimistic, opinion-oriented democratic
institution.
The Tet Offensive – The Turning Point in the Relationship
The most detrimental position taken by the United States government during the
early years of Vietnam was presenting a false image that the war was going well. But
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when the Viet Cong launched the Tet offensive in January 1968, the media, Congress,
and the American public were taken off guard. The optimism of the Johnson
administration could not prepare the nation for this attack that lasted for weeks.
The media have long been accused of reporting the Tet offensive as a victory for
the North Vietnamese military. On the contrary, our forces defeated the North
Vietnamese while the Viet Cong suffered heavy losses. Charles Mohr, who spent four
years covering the Vietnam War for the New York Times, wrote in retrospect about the
battle of Tet:
At 9 a.m. on January 31 the Vietnam press corps was in no position to declare a
result, victory or otherwise, in the Tet offensive (we were not even calling it that
yet), a complex event that was to continue for many weeks of intense combat. We
had not yet had breakfast on the first day of what was to be a prolonged
adventure; we had not even had a formal news briefing by Military Assistance
Command Vietnam on the situation in Saigon and in South Vietnam as a whole.
But by then we knew that much of Saigon was overrun by Viet Cong…No
professional, serious journalist could have ignored the embassy attack. (Mohr,
1983, p. 51)
Jacqueline Sharkey points out, “What the United States did lose during Tet was
the illusion, maintained continuously by the White House, the State Department and the
Pentagon, that the war was going well” (Sharkey, 1991, p. 53). Clark Clifford
emphasized this point further by stating that the Tet offensive “made a mockery of what
the American military had told the public about the war, and devastated Administration
credibility” (Clifford, 1991, p. 52). He continued by saying that it was the “size and
scope” of the offensive in addition to the high number of casualties, not the news
coverage, that helped turn public opinion against the war overall. However, because of
the media’s pessimism, many military officials pointed to the news coverage of Tet as
one of the major reasons the American public turned against the war.
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Some studies concur with such conclusions of military leaders. Peter Braestrup, a
former Marine and Washington Post bureau chief in Saigon, presented Big Story, a
exhaustive analysis of the Tet news coverage. His study concluded that “the media over-
reacted to and sensationalized the action, and conveyed a picture of American and South
Vietnamese troops with their backs literally against the wall” (Wyatt, 1986, p. 105). By
doing so, Braestrap concludes that the news media made a psychological defeat out of
what would be considered a military victory, and contributed to the decline of popular
support at home.
Herein lies one of the greatest myths to come out of the Vietnam War as a whole.
Public opinion polls showed that news coverage of Tet did not deteriorate Americans’
support for the war. On the contrary, the percentage of Americans who supported the war
effort actually increased after the offensive (Braestrup, 1978, p. 505). According to the
Gallup organization, the number of Americans who expressed confidence in U.S. military
policies in South Vietnam rose from 61% in December 1967 to 74% in February 1968.
Perhaps the greatest fallacy of the war that had the greatest impact on public
opinion was the government’s ability to make the scene in Vietnam more positive.
Vietnam was considered a public relations war (Sharkey, 1991). President Johnson
himself based his foreign policy on controlling public opinion. Hammond states that the
president’s inability to formulate a decisive course of action after Tet was a major reason
why U.S. support for the war began to decline following the offensive. He wrote, “The
lack of any effort by Johnson to marshal public opinion in his favor also affected the
American public’s mood of aggressiveness, which likewise began to drain away”
(Hammond, 1988, p. 372).
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The Changing Face of News Coverage Following Tet
Walter Cronkite took a public stand against the unpopular war shortly after the
Tet offensive. After experiencing the months following Tet firsthand, Cronkite
proclaimed his personal, anti-administration opinion on CBS’ Evening News. He said:
We have too often been disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders,
both in Vietnam and in Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings
they find in the darkest clouds. It seems now more than ever that the bloody
experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. (James, 1991, p. 18)
President Johnson, who was watching the newscast in the White House, reportedly turned
to Press Secretary George Christian, and said, “Well, if I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost
Middle America” (James, 1991, p. 18).
In a later interview, Cronkite revealed:
When I went over there, I didn’t know what I was going to report back, actually. I
didn’t go over to do a hatchet job. I didn’t go over to be anti-Vietnam. I had been
very disturbed over the lack of candor of the administration with the American
public, about the constant misleading statements as to the prospects of victory –
the light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel stuff. I thought – and still think – that was the
most heinous part of the whole Vietnam adventure. (James, 1991, p. 17)
The press, along with the American people, was deceived by the government’s
official reports out of Vietnam. Thus, many correspondents set out to experience the war
firsthand, reporting the brutal reality of the war, and not counting on official reports to fill
their columns. Aware that the exhaustion of the war was spreading at home, reporters
began to change the way they reported the war. Some reporters showed little sympathy
for the soldiers in the field. Reports of drug abuse, interracial tensions, attacks upon
officers by rebellious enlisted men, and the refusal to obey lawful orders in combat often
dominated war coverage (Hammond, 1994, p. 2103). Because of such reporting, many
officers had little to do with reporters, often neglecting to provide transportation to
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correspondents covering combat operations. Many times, the same officers would delay
the release of information until press deadlines had passed and failed to present timely
press briefings to the press corps. In the eyes of the media, military credibility was at an
all-time low. And in turn, mistrust of the media continued to escalate among military
commanders. This mistrust by both entities would continue for the remaining years of the
war and would continue to affect the overall relationship between the military and media
in subsequent wars.
Conclusion
In 1987, Marine Corps Major Cass D. Howell expressed the feelings of many
officers when he wrote, “The power and impact of television was the deciding factor in
turning American public opinion from one of supporting U.S. defense of South Vietnam
to one of opposing it” (Howell, 1987, p. 72). But perhaps Ted Koppel countered this
argument best when he states, “People don’t need television to tell them a boy has gone
to Southeast Asia and not come back” (Wyatt, 1986, p. 104).
In their studies on the media and public opinion, both Hallin and Hammond
concluded that media coverage was accurate and supportive of U.S. involvement in South
Vietnam. According to both scholars, when popular consensus changed toward the war,
the media began portraying the situation in South Asia as serious.
Although the military would like to blame the changing of public support for the
war on the press and the images it presented, scholars such as Michael Sherer, Hammond
and John Mueller point out that it was the high number of casualties and confusion about
the goals of the conflict that led the public to lose faith in the operations. Hammond
43
concluded that public opinion fell 15 points every time casualties increased by a factor of
10. In 1991, Colonel Summers stated in his testimony about Gulf War restrictions that:
…blaming the media for the loss of the Vietnam War was wrong. The media, and
television in particular, is good at showing the cost of the war. But [the] cost of
anything only has meaning in relation to value…It was not the news media, which
reported the price, that lost the war. It was the government which, especially in
the case of President Lyndon B. Johnson, deliberately failed to establish its value.
(Summers, 1991, pp. 1-2).
The Vietnam War provided military personnel with a new model for information
control. Although evidence rebuking the sentiments of many commanders were published
in the years following Vietnam, many military officials remained strong in their
conviction that the  media turned the public against the war. Major Howell reemphasized
this point in 1987 when he wrote:
In retrospect, it is easy to see that the unlimited and often biased reporting of the
Vietnam War severely limited the military’s prosecution of it by undermining
public support for the cause. It is not a possibility but a probability that this will
occur again should the United States go to the defense of another ally. (Howell,
1987, 77)
Such sentiment would make way for press restrictions in the next major U.S. offensive,
coming nearly two decades after the end of Vietnam.
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CHAPTER 4
GRENADA: UNPRECEDENTED MEDIA RESTRAINTS AND FORMATION OF
THE MEDIA’S “COMPLAINT DISCOURSE”
On the morning of October 25, 1983, United States forces invaded Grenada, a
small island in the Caribbean with a population of 110,000. Only days before the initial
invasion, President Maurice Bishop was overthrown in a military coup and was executed.
In the midst of the takeover, more than 100 of his supporters were massacred in the
nation’s capital of St. George. Prior to this takeover, the Reagan administration had
targeted Grenada as a major Cold War concern. The coup caused the administration to
see the situation as crucial. Immediately after the massacre in Grenada’s capital, Reagan
and his advisors assembled the largest American military operation since the Vietnam
War. “Operation Urgent Fury” was planned and administered quickly.
The quick deployment of troops was administered for a central mission: 1) find
and rescue the nearly 700 American medical students that studied at St. George
University; 2) rescue Governor General Paul Scoons, who had been jailed by the new
regime; and 3) neutralize the Grenadian People’s Revolutionary Army and secure the
island. By October 28, the military had achieved its goals in Grenada. In a televised
speech, President Reagan told the American people that Grenada was “a Soviet-Cuban
colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine
democracy…We got there just in time” (Naparstek, 1993).
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Operation Urgent Fury was hardly extraordinary in terms of military
achievements. For years, American forces had intervened in Latin American countries
countless times. But what made the invasion different, and pertinent to American
democracy, was an unofficial objective of the mission: it was the military’s intention to
maintain complete control over information coming in and out of the island. Therefore,
unprecedented restraints were placed on the press, not allowing journalists anywhere near
the island until the operation was completely over. One White House official said the
Chairman of the Joint Chief’s of Staff, General John Vessey Jr. believed that, “If you get
newspeople into this, you lose support of public opinion” (Maraniss, 1983, p. A2).
Vessey’s voice reflects many military commanders’ views after Vietnam.
Peter Braestrup, like many American journalists of the time, said the actions were
unprecedented and unacceptable. He wrote:
…the government’s failure, at the outset, to allow an independent flow of
information to the public about a major military operation was unprecedented in
modern American history…In World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and lesser military
engagements, civilian authorities saw to it that, in keeping with our tradition as an
open society, reasonable provision was made for journalists in war zones. There
was tacit agreement between the military and the media that the president, in his
role as commander-in-chief, and his civilian subordinates assumed responsibility
for media policy as for the war effort as a whole. Civilian authority did not defer,
as it did in Grenada, to the commander in the field. (Braestrup, 1985, p. 3)
And although members of the press were furious about being completely
excluded, the American people were essentially supportive of such restraints. According
to Cable News Network (CNN) news director Daniel Schorr, 80 percent of the logged
calls to his network supported Pentagon restrictions on the press. When CBS news placed
a “censored” graphic on any reports out of Grenada, many calls came in charging the
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network with being “unpatriotic” (Young, 1997, p. 133). In response to such public
support, a Pentagon spokesman told a reporter, “I guess most people don’t think I have to
tell you a damn thing” (Young, 1997, p. 133).
Although very short, “Operation Urgent Fury” had a profound effect on the
relationship between the military and the media. The mistrust of both entities by each
other propagated by the Vietnam War remained strong during the invasion. During the
three days of the operation, strife between the military and the media continued, growing
stronger for each day the press was excluded. Grenada became the first American
military operation to ever exclude the press from coverage with the explicit goal of
assuring that only “official” pictures of the combat were seen by the public. Time
correspondent Bernard Diederich wrote an article for Worldview in 1984 stating, “Reality
was the first casualty of the Grenada ‘war,’ and there was something strangely Orwellian
about the whole affair – as if ‘1984’ had arrived early” (Diederich, 1984, p. 7).
It is necessary to understand the implications of such exclusion, both on the
tumultuous relationship of the media and the military and the type of reporting permitted
in subsequent wars. This chapter attempts to illustrate a concise understanding of such
implications.
Explanation of Restrictions
A day after the invasion, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger affirmed that
military leaders had decided to not allow journalists to witness the invasion. He stated
that journalists would be allowed in Grenada “as soon as the commanders notify us that it
is appropriate” (Hunter, 1983, p. A12). Members of the media and Congress were
stunned at the defense secretary’s comments, thinking that such a policy had severe
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implications for proponents of the U.S. Constitution. In a New York Times editorial, such
sentiments were apparent:
What a perversion of the idea of civilian control of the military…It’s not a case of
accommodating a few hundred reporters or their employers. It’s a case of
responsibility to 235 million Americans who depend on those reporters. The
public needs to know what its Government is doing, the more so when it commits
troops to an expedition whose wisdom is debated so heatedly. (The New York
Times, 1983, p. A26)
Reagan backed up Weinberger’s statement, saying that reporters would be
allowed in Grenada when the Defense Department decided it was safe enough. The
rationale of safety was the first explanation given in regards to exclusion. But reporters
argued that many correspondents worked under much more dangerous conditions in the
past. Safety, to them, should not be an issue. Walter Cronkite responded by saying, “For
heaven’s sake, journalists have been going into unsafe places from time immemorial to
get the story” (Cronkite, 1983, p. S14964). He called the media blackout a “terribly
dangerous precedent, an impossible precedent.”
Another explanation given to the media about press exclusion was that the
operation was planned so quickly, that there was no time to set up a strategic public
affairs plan. In a study conducted by Jacqueline Sharkey, many military officers said this
statement was untrue (Sharkey, 1991, p. 73). However, much needs to be examined about
the planning of this mission and its correlation to the exclusion of the media. Perhaps, the
haphazard planning of the operation caused potential embarrassment for the Pentagon in
the initial stages of the mission. Military officers did not know the location of many of
the medical students they were sent to save. U.S. troops were confused about who the
actual enemy was and were supplied with tourist maps instead of strategic military maps.
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And when U.S. forces accidentally bombed a mental hospital, more than a dozen
innocent people were killed. And so, in the big scheme of things, perhaps the government
did not want the media to have access to such blunders. By excluding the media, the
government attempted to hide impending problems that resulted from a quickly planned
mission.
But perhaps the most honest rendition of the Pentagon’s decision to exclude the
media came from the Joint Task Force Commander for the Grenada Operation, Vice
Admiral Joseph W. Metcalf, who told reporters, “I’m down here to take an island. I don’t
need you running around and getting in the way” (Sharkey, 1991, p. 73).
Restrictions are Tested
Reporters trying to reach the island during the press blackout soon learned the
seriousness of the ban. ABC correspondent Josh Mankiewicz had hired a fishing boat to
reach the island, but quickly turned back when a U.S. destroyer cut across the boat’s bow.
Two other ABC staffers, Steve Shepard and Tim Ross, hired another boat, but were
forced back by a Navy plane. Ross recounted:
The Navy jet came over and made a couple of runs at us…First it just waggled its
wings. Then it made a lateral pass. Finally, it opened the bomb doors, and the
pilot dropped a buoy about 30 feet ahead of us just to show what else he could
drop and how close he could drop it. (Sharkey, 1991, p. 73)
A CBS correspondent chartered a plane in Barbados, a nearby island, and taped some
aerial shots of Grenada and naval activity before a U.S. jet chased off his plane (Castro,
1983, p. 65).
Four journalists who did reach the island – Edward Cody of the Washington Post,
Don Bohning of the Miami Herald, Morris Thompson of Newsday and a British reporter
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– were met by Grenadian troops at the shore. They were escorted to a nearby fire station
and were held in communicado by Admiral Metcalf. Anticipating U.S. intervention, the
four reporters originally left Barbados the day before the invasion, arriving about 7 _
hours after the operation had begun. While detained, the correspondents listened to radio
reports that the war was over. Diederich would later write:
…nothing the radio reported matched what was happening on the ground. As we
sat literally on Fort Rupert’s doorstep, Radio Trinidad broadcast a war
communique from U.S. sources describing how U.S. Marines were storming the
fort, although only lizards were stirring on the ancient battlements before us.
(Diederich, 1984, p. 7)
The reporters were later moved to a hotel where they attempted to file their reports. All
phone lines were dead, hindering any firsthand accounts of the ensuing action.
In a letter sent by CBS president Edward Joyce to Weinberger, strong convictions
about the imposed exclusion and censorship of the news media were reiterated. The letter
stated:
I wish to protest in the strongest possible terms the position of the Defense
Department in restricting CBS News’ access to the island of Grenada.
I would also like to protest the attitude expressed by your Public Affairs offices as
indicated in the statements of Colonel Robert O’Brien and Lt. Colonel Leon
DeLorme today to our correspondent Bill Lynch that “we learned a lesson from
the British in the Faulklands.” To use the censorship by the British as an example
to be followed by the United States in this military operation is baffling to me and
deeply disturbing because it refutes the principles of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. (E. Joyce, letter, 1983)
The government and military officials stayed steadfast in their plan. The media were not
allowed on the island until the operation was over.
“Cleared by Defense Department Censors”
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What the media and the public did receive were “official” images presented by
the United States military. Early video footage showed weapons found on the island and
Cuban prisoners. Much of the Pentagon video showed no combat and what Washington
Post TV critic Tom Shales characterized as “American students smiling, blowing kisses
and flashing the ‘V’ sign as they were escorted off the island under military protection”
(Shales, 1983, p. B1). But these were the only images available to news organizations,
and they were used in both print and broadcast media. However, using the images was
definitely scrutinized by the networks. Footage aired by CBS News was superimposed
with the words “Cleared by Defense Dept. Censors.” NBC’s Tom Brokaw introduced
video by warning viewers that the Reagan administration had “tightly controlled” news
coverage of Grenada. CBS’ Dan Rather warned the audience that the footage had been
“shot by the Army and censored by the Army” (Shales, 1983, p. B1).
The Public Reacts
What was most detrimental to the media’s cause for more access was that the
public, the main entity that the press claims to serve, did not show strong support for the
media’s battle against press restrictions. Citing several polls conducted during this period,
Combelles-Sigel stated that 52 % of respondents approved of the limitations on press
access to Grenada; 64 %  believed the explanations given by the Reagan administration
for excluding the press and only 25 % believed press restrictions occurred because the
administration wanted to manipulate the public; and 47 % approved of excluding the
press until the mission was complete (Combelles-Siegel, 1996, p. 3). When editors of
Editor and Publisher surveyed a dozen daily newspapers, they found letters to the editor
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running 3 to 1 in favor of press restrictions. Time received 225 letters which favored the
restrictions 8 to 1 (Henry, 1983, p. 76).
“Operation Urgent Fury” did not only cause strife between the media and the
military. It appeared that the development of a major division had occurred between the
press and the public as well. The public had questioned the morality of the press corps for
some time. But just days before the Grenada invasion, 241 U.S. servicemen were killed in
the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. Americans at home watched reporters and
cameras pry into the lives of the families who had lost loved ones; quintessentially
putting the question of morality into play again. In essence, the shift in the public’s
perception of the press was caused by sensational writing and by photographs that
marked this period of journalism (Sharkey, 1991; Naparstek, 1993) Perhaps the public
did not want this type of press to cover the events in Grenada. In fact, once the press was
allowed access to the island, a major news magazine published a graphic photograph of a
young Marine helicopter pilot lying dead on the beach. The public was not ready to see
this type of image and was readily in support of press restrictions governed by the
Reagan administration.
The Media Seeks Revisions of Restrictions
After some initial criticism of the press ban, many members in Congress became
silent when it was apparent that Reagan’s decision to invade Grenada was popular with
the people. A House subcommittee held hearings on such restrictions as part of a series of
hearings on national security and civil liberties. Some media executives were asked to
submit written and oral testimony that warned of the implications of future press bans.
CBS President Edward Joyce wrote:
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I am seriously concerned that we may indeed be witnessing the dawn of a new era
of censorship, of manipulation of the press, of considering the media the
handmaiden of government to spoon feed the public with government-approved
information…I am concerned that such action will be taken again and again,
whenever a government wishes to keep the public in the dark. (Joyce, 1983, p. 11)
By mid-November 1983, many media groups were looking to challenge the
constitutionality of the press ban in Grenada. Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler magazine,
was the first to file a lawsuit. Jack Landau, Executive Director of the Reporter’s
Committee for Freedom of the Press, led another group in a lawsuit. The committee
conducted a survey of all U.S. military engagements from 1754-1983 and concluded that
reporters could not be legally excluded from a war.
In response to such lawsuits, the Pentagon asked retired Army Major General
Sidle to prepare a report that would set precedence for a new media-military relationship.
Released on August 23, 1984, the Sidle Report was “accepted” by media executives and
the Pentagon. The report stated:
The American people must be informed about United States military operations
and this information can best be provided through both the news media and the
Government. Therefore, the panel believes it is essential that the U.S. news media
cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with
mission security and safety of U.S. forces. (Sidle, 1984, p. 3)
The report promised to implement various recommendations, including to initiate public
affairs and operational planning both simultaneously, to rely on voluntary ground rules,
to provide more transportation and communication facilities for media efforts, to
schedule meetings between military and media representatives, and to provide additional
public affairs training for military personnel.
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In addition to the above recommendations, the Sidle Report implemented the
establishment of a national media pool. This became the most controversial elements of
the Sidle Report and would be tested and scrutinized intensely in subsequent wars. Pool
coverage involves the combined resources of several media outlets to report on any
conflict. The Pentagon basically chooses members of the National Media Pool by a
lottery. Pool reporters, usually made of 11 members from different media outlets, write
accounts of the activities they view during the combat and share that information with
other members outside the immediate pool. The implementation of this pool system
would be tested extensively just five years after Grenada, when “Operation Just Cause”
erupted in Panama.
Conclusion
The American press was excluded from the military operation in Grenada to an
extent unprecedented in our nation’s history. This exclusion, stemming from the mistrust
of the media at the conclusion of Vietnam, held unparalleled ramifications in the
relationship between the military and the media. And although members of the media
argued that restrictions limited the view of the battle from the American people, the
public backed the government’s decision of exclusion. Roger Pinus wrote, “The
Grenadian press exclusion gave rise to more rancor between government and the news
media than any event since the Pentagon Papers. Despite the recommendations of the
Sidle Report, tensions persist, and future conflicts and recriminations many be inevitable”
(Pincus, 1997, p. 850).
Perhaps more than anything else, the conflict in Grenada clearly presented the
conflict between both the military and the media, and the media and the public. After the
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conflict, however, it was apparent that changes were inevitably needed in attempts to
mend both sets of relationships. “Operation Just Cause” in Panama would be the test of
the relationship and the new implementations set forth by the Sidle Report.
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CHAPTER 5
THE INVASION OF PANAMA:
A TEST OF THE SIDLE REPORT
After the invasion of Grenada, and the ensuing press restrcitions that followed, the
complaint discourse of the media became strong. The complaints deserved merit because
it was the first time such press restrictions were inflicted upon the media. In subseuqnet
years, the discourse strengthened, and media professionals needed a true test of the Sidle
Report.
When General Manuel Noriega took control of the Panamanian government in
1983, U.S. officials were delighted. As records show, Noriega had worked for the United
States as an intelligence resource since 1958 (United States v. Manuel Antonio Noreiga,
et al., 1991). But in 1988, when two grand juries in Florida handed down drug trafficking
and money laundering indictments against Noriega, conflict between the United States
and the Panamanian government escalated. The situation reached an high point during
1989 when street violence erupted in response to the presidential election, when
Noreiga’s hand-picked candidate, Carlos Duque, apparently lost the election to Guillerrno
Edara by a margin of more than 2-to-1. Noreiga had the election nullified and installed
another associate, Francisco Rodriguez, as head of the provisional government. The Bush
administration, seeing an invasion as eminent, began preparations. Among these
preparations, the Bush administration planned how the media coverage should be
handled.
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In mid-December 1989, one U.S. officer was killed and a Panamanian soldier was
wounded in connection with altercations between Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) and
U.S. soldiers in the streets of Panama City. Noreiga said that the conditions resembled a
state of war with the United States. On December 20, 1989, U.S. military forces launched
a massive land, sea, and air invasion of Panama. “Operation Just Cause” was the first
major military operation since Grenada, and the largest operation since Vietnam. Panama
was also the first military operation to test the press pool system implemented by the
Sidle Panel. William Kennedy wrote:
What is most striking about the behavior of the press…throughout the early pool
deployments and the Panama invasion is that it looked solely and entirely to the
government for a solution to its problems of wartime coverage. It was the
government that must devise a system by which the press could get to the scene of
action. It was the government that must make all of the physical arrangements. It
was the government that must provide the information that would enable pool
members to understand what the deployment was all about and the nature of the
troops they would be accompanying and to arrange upon arrival for explanations
of what was going on, weapons being used, and so on. (Kennedy, 1993, p. 116)
But what became apparent during the early stages of the operation in Panama was that the
pool system was not implemented properly, causing much strife among the military and
the media.
Mistakes are Made in Informing the Media
Initially, it appeared that the military had learned a valuable lesson from the
events in Grenada. On November 13, 1989, over a month before the beginning of
“Operation Just Cause,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the public affairs office of the
U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom) to draft a plan for dealing with the media in case of
an invasion. SouthCom assumed that a pool of reporters already in Panama would
perform the initial reporting of the incident, thus not needing a pool from Washington,
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D.C. Because of a lack of communication, the decision of whether the pool should be
created from reporters in Washington and Panama was delayed until only five and a half
hours before the invasion began. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney decided to use the
Washington press pool because “we were accustomed to it” and pool members “knew the
ground rules” (Sharkey, 1991, p. 93). Like Grenada, secrecy was paramount to the
success of the mission. And Cheney was afraid that if the press pool was deployed too
soon, security breeches would be eminent. Therefore, as of December 19, no equipment,
transportation, or provisions were established for journalists when the actual invasion
occurred. So, even if the pool had been activated in a timely manner, it would be poorly
supported once it arrived in Panama. Pete Williams, the Defense Department’s Assistant
Secretary of Public Affairs, began notifying pool members at 7:30 p.m. on December 19.
As the invasion began, reporters were en route from Washington, D.C. to Panama and did
not arrive until more than four hours after the initial start of the operation.
The pool was made up of four photographers, six print correspondents, one radio
reporter, and an NBC television reporter. Lack of planning, however, deterred initial
reporting of the operation. Once they arrived in Panama, there was no transportation
available. Instead, the reporters were sent to a holding room where they watched a Bush
news conference on television. While awaiting transportation, the pool correspondents
were allowed to report on events on the base at which they were being held. Such
hindrances were signs of what was to come for the pool reporters. Fred Hoffman, former
newsman and Pentagon official, wrote:
Excessive concern for secrecy prevented timely detailed planning for the pool’s
coverage of Operation Just Cause.  A lack of helicopters – which could have been
avoided with proper planning – prevented the pool from reporting much of what
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was left of the action by the time the pool reached Panama. Some  U.S. military
concern in Panama for the safety of the pool members impeded coverage…The
result of all of this was that the 16-member pool produced stories and pictures of
essentially secondary value. (Hoffman, 1991, p. 92)
Once the pool was allowed in the field, many military commanders had not been
briefed about the journalists’ arrival and refused to talk to them. Some commanders even
said they were told not to talk to journalists. In addition, reporters were not allowed to
talk with wounded soldiers, and photographers were told to not take pictures of downed
helicopters or the closed caskets of U.S. soldiers who had died in combat (Hoffman,
1990, p. 11).
Once the pool reporters returned to media headquarters, they found it very
difficult to transmit copy. The Pentagon fax machine that was suppose to receive the
copy and send it to other news organizations malfunctioned. Calls to the media center
were misdirected to another office or the phones simply went unanswered. Hours passed
before reporters knew they had to resend their copy (Hoffman, 1990, p. 14).
Photographers, too, had a difficult time in reporting back to the States.
Transmission of pictures over phone lines was interrupted as Panamanian operators
continually broke the lines. According to Reuters photographer Tim Aubrey, it took 10
hours to send six to eight photos when it should have taken less than two hours
(Hoffman, 1990, p. 14).
Vietnam Revisited: Misinforming the Press
Physical and technical obstacles, like the ones mentioned above, deterred
complete reporting from Panama. But perhaps the most detrimental aspect of reporting
the Panama invasion was the misinforming of the press pools during U.S. briefings in
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Panama and Washington. These briefings, as reports later show, gave a false, optimistic
view of events, concealing many military mistakes and casualties (Hoffman, 1991;
Sharkey, 1991).
For example, during the first days of the invasion, the Pentagon insisted that no
U.S. troops had been killed or wounded by friendly fire. Yet, six months after the
invasion, Newsweek ran an investigative article that revealed friendly fire had killed or
wounded more than a dozen troops in action. The ensuing dialogue at a June 19 Pentagon
briefing charged the Defense Department with concealing the casualties during the actual
invasion. A reporter asked if the Secretary of Defense knew of the casualties, whereas
Department of Defense spokesman Pete Williams replied, “The Secretary, the Chairman
and the President all knew.” When the reporter asked, “How come we didn’t,” Williams
answered, “That’s a good question. I’m not sure that I totally know the answer to that
one, but obviously we need to do better” (Defense Department Briefing, June 19, 1990, p.
2).
But misguiding did not stop here. During Pentagon briefings through much of
1990, U.S. spokesmen estimated that 202 civilians and 314 military personnel had died
through the duration of the invasion. However, several human rights organizations
reported that civilian deaths had been underestimated, while military deaths were
overestimated (Cousins, 1990; Hockstrader, 1990; Rohter, 1990). In fact, the reports said
more civilians were killed than military personnel. Some allegations arose that many
civilians had been buried in unmarked mass graves. SouthCom issued a fact sheet in
December 1990 that would explain the body count. According to the report, Panama’s
coroner’s office had identified 65 military and 157 civilian remains. Thus, what some
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human rights groups were arguing was essentially true. More civilians died in Panama
than military personnel. The fact sheet rebuts any claims of unmarked graves, however.
The report concludes that issues pertaining to a complete body count “may ultimately
escape complete resolution” (United States Southern Command, 1990, p. 5).
As another example of misleading, two days after the invasion had begun, U.S.
officials took reporters to one of the residences of Noreiga while he was still at large. As
military personnel opened the freezer of the residence, they found plastic bags full of a
white, powdery substance that was revealed as cocaine. Pentagon briefer, Lieutenant
General Kelly, said the cocaine weighed 50 kilograms (Defense Department Briefing,
December 22, 1989). Reports surfaced, however, that the substance was not cocaine. In
fact, speaking on conditions of anonymity, several Pentagon sources told reporters that
the substance was used in voodoo rituals, and was designed to cast a spell on Bush and
members of Congress (Meddis, 1990, p. A4). After going back and forth about the
legitimacy of the story, Williams finally admitted that the substance was not cocaine, but
ingredients used to make tamales. And although Pentagon officials insisted that no
attempt was made to mislead the press, it had never corrected the mistake until pressured
by the media (Sharkey, 1991).
Tired of being misled by the military, CNN aired a telephone number that
residents of Panama could call to report what was happening around them (Warren, 1989,
p. A16). CNN received hundreds of calls, providing vivid and revealing descriptions of
what was going on. Residents described civilians running to escape gunfire. Such
descriptions contrasted the Pentagon’s assumptions of a well-organized operation
planned to minimize damage to neighborhoods. It also showed Pentagon officials what
61
would occur if cameras were allowed to capture the action first-hand. CNN executive Ed
Turner would later say in an interview, “The White House and Pentagon were on TV
insisting that we’d won, that everything was under control, and we were just mopping up.
But viewers in Panama would call to say that the fighting was going on in their front yard
by rose bushes” (Richmond, 1989, p. A12).
The bulk of deaths occurred on the first night of the invasion. Although the
American media were unable to witness the onslaught of the invasion, many
Panamanians came forward with vivid descriptions of that first night. One resident of El
Chorillo described American soldiers “entering each house. We saw the people – the
residents – coming out, followed by the soldiers, and then we saw the houses, one by one,
go up in smoke. The U.S. soldiers were burning the houses” (as cited in Naparsek, 1993).
No one will ever really know what happened in the small town of El Chorillo that night.
However, if the media had been allowed to accompany troops to the town during the
beginning of the invasion, suspicions would have either been confirmed or resolved.
Frustrated at the situation and limited access, pool reporters coined two self-
proclaimed mottoes: “Semper Tardis” (“Always Late”), and “If it’s news today, it’s news
to us” (Boot, 1990, p. 18). One member of the pool, Kevin Merida of the Dallas Morning
News, articulated the frustration of limited access even further:
The military seemed to have no concept of what our role was. The whole first day
was devoted to taking us to places where the action was already over. It was like
forming a White House pool and then showing them an empty hall saying, “This
is where the president spoke.” ( as cited in Naparsek, 1993)
The Bray Incident Calls for New Stipulations
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On January 2, 1990, a story by correspondent Peter Copeland appeared in the
Washington Times reporting that Captain Linda Bray and her unit encountered 40
“heavily armed troops” when they tried to secure a facility in Panama City. In addition,
the unit found three enemy soldiers dead there (Copeland, 1990, p. A1). The story created
a media frenzy, and members of the press insisted that more information about the
mission be made available.
According to SouthCom’s after-action report, parts of Copeland’s story were not
accurate. The unit did not find dead bodies and Bray herself did not know how many
enemy troops they had encountered. According to Copeland, he based the story on an
interview he had conducted with Bray shortly after the mission. But Bray could not recall
speaking specifically with Copeland. Bray did admit, however, that Copeland could have
received misinformation from other members within her unit.
The controversy resulted in further recommendations regarding the way future
conflicts should be reported. Because of conflicting stories in the Bray incident,
SouthCom’s after-action report stated that escorts should be present during all media
interviews with military personnel. The report said, “An interview should not be
conducted without going through the proper PA [public affairs] channels, i.e., the Media
Center, and without a PA representative present” (as cited in Sharkey, 1991, p. 104).
Such stipulations stemmed from the question of accuracy. To obtain the highest
level of accuracy in reporting on conflicts, the Pentagon and White House agreed that
military escorts were the answer. Air Force public affairs policies reiterate such
sentiments:
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Because the news media must be selective in their coverage, and often assume the
role of government’s skeptical observer or adversary, they may filter information
in ways which cause imbalance or inaccuracies. Nevertheless, Air Force media
relations programs must be open and responsive within the bounds of national
security, not withholding information simply because it is embarrassing to the Air
Force. (as cited in Sharkey, 1991, p. 104)
The Bray incident reinforced the perception that an escort system was necessary
in regards to media relations. This system would be implemented during the Gulf War,
just one year later.
Conclusion
The invasion of Panama proved to be the first true test of the Sidle Report
established only five years prior. For journalists, the test ended in failure. The pool was
deployed too late to cover the onslaught of the war. Misleadings by military leaders and
the White House caused the credibility of the military to be questioned and challenged
again. New stipulations between the military and the media arose. The Hoffman Report,
along with SouthCom’s after-action report, focused on problems caused not by the media,
but by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.
The Hoffman report was the more critical of the two post-Panama reports. The
report refuted the Defense Department’s concern for secrecy as the excuse for late
deployment of the national press pool. The report stressed that during previous pool
deployments, “hundreds of newsmen and newswomen demonstrated that they could be
trusted to respect essential ground rules, including operational security.” In addition, the
military’s claim that the pool was not deployed sooner due to safety concerns for the
members of the press was also scrutinized by the Hoffman Report. According to the
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report, safety considerations “should not have been allowed to limit the pool’s reporting
opportunities. Newsmen and women cover wars at their own risk” (Hoffman, 1990, p. 1).
The Hoffman report concluded with 17 essential recommendations that included
additional public affairs planning; better transportation and communication facilities for
pool operations; and a detailed policy from the Secretary of Defense in support for the
DOD national media pool and his contention that other Pentagon officials support it.
The opportunity to implement such recommendations occurred much sooner than
initially anticipated. Less than seven months later, the Pentagon would revisit these




REVISITING TURMOIL BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND MEDIA
Just seven months after the termination of Operation Just Cause, President Bush
ordered the deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia for what would be termed
Operation Desert Shield. Emphasis was placed on the U.S.’s role in the Gulf as primarily
defensive. In a propagandistic way, Bush compared Saddam Hussein’s invasion of
Kuwait with the Nazi blitzkrieg in Europe during the 1930s, and Hussein himself with
Adolf Hitler. Bush’s famous metaphor warning that a “line has been drawn in the sand”
signaled that anything less than an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was unacceptable.
(Bush, 1990, p. 1-2). In regards to the president’s decision to deploy troops, public
opinion polls illustrated a strong initial support for Bush’s actions. In fact, a New York
Times poll indicated 74 percent of Americans approved of his decision (Oreskes, 1990, p.
13).
This was the beginning of what would be the largest U.S. offensive since Vietnam
and the first major long-term conflict fought since Vietnam. Regardless, not a single
journalist accompanied American troops when they were deployed to Saudi Arabia. The
activation of the national press pool was once again ignored, and individual journalists
were not able to obtain Saudi visas. Michael Wines, a correspondent for the New York
Times, wrote, “For the second time in eight months, American troops today headed into a
foreign military operation without the special contingent of reporters and photographers
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that the Pentagon has pledged to summon when the United States forces are sent abroad”
(Wines, 1990, p. A14).
President Bush defended the decision to not deploy the national media pool
because, according to him, “there’s plenty of reporters in Saudi Arabia.” This
assumption, however, was incorrect. In fact, not a single American reporter was present
in Saudi Arabia due in part because the country had historically controlled its press and
had not allowed Western journalists to spend much time there.
Struggles between the press and military would continue throughout the war in
the Gulf. Just as in previous wars, questions of First Amendment suppression would
dominate the media’s coverage of the war. William Kennedy wrote:
During the months leading up to the Persian Gulf War…and throughout the war
itself the U.S. government succeeded, for the first time in U.S. history, in
controlling almost totally what the public would be permitted to know about the
conduct of military operations. That happened not because government is as yet
all-powerful, but because a smug, arrogant, and self-righteous press was operating
twentieth- and twenty-first-century technology with nineteenth-century concepts
of organization, training and management. (Kennedy, 1993, p. x)
So with the inception of the Persian Gulf conflict came immediate questions of
suppression of the media once again. And as satellite technology broadened and became
more widely used by news organizations, the military’s fear of security leaks heightened.
This would ultimately make access to the battlefield even more difficult for reporters and
contribute to the media’s overall negative view of the military.
Just as in any war, public opinion played an enormous role in the deployment of
the media to cover the conflict. Public opinion polls illustrated the public’s vision of not
wanting to see the nation drawn into a lengthy war like it was in Vietnam. In a New York
Times poll, 4 in 10 respondents believed that Bush did not clearly explain why U.S.
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troops  had been deployed to Saudi Arabia (Oreskes, 1990, p. 13). Accordingly, New
York Times Executive Editor Max Frankel stated, “A major military exercise cannot
succeed without sustained support and understanding of the American people, and it will
not long be supported or understood without extensive and close-up news reporting”
(Jones, 1990, p. A10).
Operation Desert Shield
Five days after the initial troop deployment, the Department of Defense acquired
visas for 17 members of the national press pool. Initially, members of the press pool
praised the access and cooperation they received. Navy Captain Mike Sherman
accompanied the media pool while they were in Saudi Arabia. The only specific guidance
he was given by the Defense Department was to “take the news media out and show them
what we’re doing” (Sharkey, 1991, p. 110).
Pool reporters proved they were sensitive to operational security. When they
arrived in the Gulf, journalists learned that the U.S. had not sent enough troops to
withstand an Iraqi attack. The correspondents never reported this information. In a speech
presented to the National Press Club, CNN correspondent Carl Rochelle, a member of the
press pool, said:
I think you’ve heard General Schwartzkopf talk about how grateful he was that
we didn’t reveal how minimal the U.S. presence was in the early days. That was
part of the restrictions that we had accepted as being able to cover what was going
on in that area. (Rochelle, 1991, p. 6)
This would become an important epiphany for the military. The press proved that they
would withhold information if correspondents deemed it detrimental to the mission. They
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proved that they understood the responsibility the press had to the military, as well as the
public.
After more than 300 U.S. and foreign journalists arrived in Saudi Arabia on
August 26, 1990, the DOD national press pool was disbanded. The Pentagon’s newly
established Joint Information Bureau (JIB) began establishing procedures for unilateral
news coverage. One job of the JIB was to arrange interviews and excursions for
journalists deployed to the region. Journalists would submit story requests to the JIB
public affairs officers, who would arrange the details. Because transportation and military
escorts were limited, journalists were taken to the field in groups. Unlike the pool system,
however, correspondents would write their story for their own news organization.
Although initial operations in the Gulf were more accessible than previous
operations, restrictions were still in place on the media. Because field commanders did
not want dozens of reporters and photographers to take up too much of their units’ time,
journalists were told not to visit military units on their own. In addition, the JIB was
overwhelmed by thousands of story requests from reporters. However, due to limited
transportation, many requests went unanswered. Such limitations led to numerous
complaints, resulting in many journalists not signing the ground-rules agreement. Such
journalists decided to get stories on their own, often compromising security. Such
problems once again led to the military’s doubt of media credibility.
Complaints by journalists did not subside with transportation issues. Pentagon
officials closely monitored Desert Shield news coverage. Reporters were warned that if
they asked hard questions, they would be perceived as “anti-military” by military
personnel (Sharkey, 1991). In addition, journalists who wrote critical stories would
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jeopardize future requests for interviews with field commanders (Sharkey, 1991, p. 111).
Some journalists also complained that military escorts were advising military personnel
not to answer certain types of questions in interviews. John Fialka wrote about this
control of information:
General Schwarzkopf gave many interviews during the war. He often used the
opportunity as another lever of control over the media, which he watched with an
ever-vigilant eye. Reporters whose stories he liked got interviews. Those stories
that didn’t pass muster with the general often found the opportunity postponed,
sometimes indefinitely. (Fialka, 1992, p. 33)
But while complaints about lack of transportation, escorts and biased information
by reporters were evident, Pentagon officials were authorizing the Military Airlift
Command (MAC) to fly journalists from small- and medium-sized print and broadcast
operations to the Gulf. This program, aptly called the Hometown Program, was based on
a successful effort conducted during the Vietnam War. As a stronger military presence
was active in the Gulf Region, the DOD felt it was imperative to keep the public well-
informed about the events. Thus, the Hometown Program was needed to fulfill such a
goal.
However, reporters from networks and large print organizations were furious at
such a program. According to them, the smaller news organizations were receiving better
access to units than correspondents already stationed there. The program was eventually
phased out on January 6, 1991, shortly before Operation Desert Storm began. The
Pentagon turned its attention to the influx of journalists who were arriving to cover the
ensuing war.
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The Imminence of War: The Battle for Press Rights Continues
Bush’s approval rating declined more than 20 points throughout September and
October of 1990. Support for his decision to deploy more troops to the Middle East
declined as well from both the American public and members of Congress. Despite his
critics, Bush announced the deployment of even more troops to Saudi Arabia in order to
“prepare for a possible offensive option” (“Bush: State of Kuwait”, 1990, p. A33). on
October 8, 1990. This was the first time Bush had alluded to possible war in the Gulf,
drawing mixed reactions from Congress and the public. To neutralize declining public
support, the White House began a campaign to convince the American public that the
offensive would be necessary to preserve U.S. interests in the Middle East.
In December, Washington news executives were sent a memorandum that
included a draft of proposed pool procedures and media ground rules that would be
implemented if a war was imminent.
According to the memo, the pool procedures would be executed in three phases.
Phase I, which began immediately, would involve two pools formed from media
personnel already in Saudi Arabia. These pools would be sent out once every two weeks
so correspondents could familiarize themselves with troops and equipment, and exercise
their ability to file reports in the field. Phase II would include deploying the two pools
when war was forthcoming. The idea was for the pools to be in place to cover the first
stages of war. If it were not possible to move the pools into the field immediately, they
would be moved as soon as conditions seemed appropriate. Additional pools would be
deployed as soon as possible to expand coverage of the offensive. Phase III would begin
“when open coverage is possible and would provide unilateral coverage of activities. The
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pools would be disbanded and all media would operate independently, although under
U.S. Central Command escort” (as cited in Sharkey, 1991, p. 118).
In addition to outlining the three phases of media pool deployment, the memo also
outlined ground rules for the media. According to these stipulations, all interviews with
members of the military would be on the record, in essence prohibiting reporters from
conducting background interviews with military personnel. In addition, journalists had to
remain with their military escorts at all times. The ground rules also explained what type
of information could not be released, including information about future operations,
activities against hostile targets, and information about postponed or canceled operations.
Media executives adamantly objected to the ground rules set forth by the
Pentagon memo. Knight-Ridder Washington Bureau Chief Clark Hoyt stated in a letter to
Pete Williams:
The proposed rules far overstep the common-sense bounds necessary to protect
the security of U.S. military operations. The specific rules about what is
“releasable” and “not releasable” are at once so broad and so vague that they are
bound to lead to disagreement and misinterpretation even now, in advance of war.
On the field, under combat conditions, the potential for misunderstanding and
inconsistent interpretation is enormous. (C. Hoyt, letter, December 18, 1990)
Hoyt’s criticism was reiterated by other media executives. Focus on the requirement of
media escorts spawned angry criticism as well. The Washington Post’s Michael Getler
deemed the idea as “simply another means of controlling everything” (M. Getler, letter,
December 18, 1990).
The proposed security reviews were also scrutinized by media executives. Charles
J. Lewis, Hearst Newspapers Washington Bureau Chief, stated that such reviews went
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beyond the provisions set forth by the Sidle Report and would become the design for the
Pentagon’s wartime media policies:
I’m sorry to see on-site “security review” in your plans. As you know, when the
national Pentagon pool was first launched in 1984, no such reviews were
contemplated. Correspondents were to comply with the “Vietnam-era rules,”
which didn’t require prior review…Those rules won a very high degree of
compliance.
Unfortunately, the practice of prior censorship has become embedded in the
Pentagon pool concept in recent years, mainly because all parties quickly
recognized that the pool was reliant on military communications. (C. Lewis,
letter, December 20, 1990)
Because of such criticism, the military revised the proposed rules set on the
media. The revisions no longer told reporters what could and could not be printed.
Security reviews, however, were still intact. But if a reporter disagreed with a military
escort’s decision to change parts of a story, the material could be sent to the director of
the JIB for review. This review process caused media executives to once again criticize
the Pentagon’s proposed rules. Getler believed that if this review system was put in place:
…it will cause a nightmare for us and, ultimately, for you and the American
public. It will inevitably, from day one of hostilities, involve grim fights between
reporters and PAOs [public affairs officers]. It will involve missed deadlines on
stories that had no right to be withheld or delayed. It will poison the atmosphere
between the press and the Pentagon and erode credibility to the point where there
will be widespread mistrust of the information that is put out in Washington or
Riyadh by the Defense Department. (M. Getler, letter, January 8, 1991)
As a result of such criticism, Pentagon officials revised the guidelines once again.
The new revisions made the escort provisions less restrictive. The new guidelines also
gave more details about what escorts would be looking for in security reviews. The
appeals process was also changed. Disagreements about a pool report would be sent to
the JIB director immediately. If no agreement was reached, the material would
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immediately be sent to Washington for review by Williams and the appropriate bureau
chief. Finally, the revised stipulations said that “the ultimate decision on publication will
be made by the originating reporter’s news organization.”
Only a day after the final revisions were made, more than 70 journalists in eight
pools were sent into the field. On January 16, 1991, U.S. and coalition aircraft began the
first air attacks against Iraqi forces. And many of the pool reporters who witnessed this
action were pleased with how the system for reviewing stories operated that night.
Technology Promotes the Media’s Influence During Operation Desert Storm
Technology took center stage in the Gulf War, televising war coverage around the
clock. According to Nathaniel Lande:
If the American military had bogged down in the rice paddies and jungles of
Vietnam, in the sands of Arabia it functioned smoothly. On television back home,
the war resembled nothing so much as a giant video game, complete with instant
replay. (Lande, 1998, p. 352)
Americans scrambled to their televisions to keep up-to-date with the latest news from the
Gulf. No other war could match the immediacy in which events during Operation Desert
Storm reached the American homes. Walter Gantz wrote, “If Vietnam was the first
television war, Operation Desert Storm was the first brought home by satellite,
sometimes live and in living color” (Gantz, 1993, p. 1). The use of satellites was
prevalent in reporting the events of the war in the Gulf. And it was perhaps this aspect of
reporting during the conflict that frightened top-ranking military officials (Gantz, 1993).
Military censors would eventually refuse journalists access to the action. But technology
often prevailed.
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The Cable News Network (CNN) had become the key informational source
during the war in the Gulf. About 250 American television stations affiliated with the
cable network aired the feed provided by CNN throughout the war. In a poll conducted
by Times Mirror, 61% of the respondents rated CNN as having done the best job in
covering the war (Gannett Foundation, 1991, p. 88). Roughly 60% of U.S. households
had cable access in the homes, with the average cable franchise offering 36 channels of
basic services, including CNN (Gantz, 1993, p. 8).
But CNN’s influence did not stop in America. Government officials across many
countries around the world noted that CNN served as an updated source of information
for them. It was even believed that Hussein relied on CNN and its international presence
to plan strategic moves of his military force. During the war, CNN was available in 105
countries. The evolution of media technology transformed CNN into a worldwide
presence. Navy Lieutenant Walker said:
I know for a fact that CNN was on 24 hours a day in the command center of
CENTCOM in Riyadh and in the national military command center here in the
Pentagon, and I’ll bet is was on 24 hours and day in Baghdad as well. We used
CNN for intelligence and if the Iraqis can sit there and fire off a SCUD and watch
it ten minutes later…they know what they were aiming at and they know what
they saw on CNN. They could therefore adjust and try to hit it the next day.
(Baroody, 1998, p. 191)
Top military officials confirmed CNN’s powerful presence in strategy and often
scrutinized the network, calling it the “Saddam Network News” (Kalb, 1994, p. 5) or
referring to the war as “The CNN War” (Laurence, 1991, p. A12).
As the war continued, people all over the world tuned to CNN for daily reports
and briefings. CNN had an 11.7 primetime rating January 17-21, 1991, higher than any of
the major networks’ ratings and better than 10 times CNN’s normal ratings. CNN was
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thrust into an international sphere of influence, much to the dissatisfaction of American
military personnel.
Guidelines Create Controversy
The final guidelines created by the military, although basically working in the
beginning, became a strong force of animosity between the military and the media.
Communications problems persisted, causing reporters’ stories to take days to reach the
joint information bureaus in both Ridayh and  Dharman. Some stories never arrived.
But, controversies regarding military escorts and security reviews plagued the
relationship even further. In the final revisions sent to news organizations prior to the
war, escorts were not suppose to interfere with the news-gathering efforts of journalists.
When the escorts conducted security reviews of copy, they were to look for possible
violations of the ground rules (Sharkey, 1991). But despite the written guidelines, many
journalists complained that a number of escorts did not follow the rules. And as the war
progressed, some military personnel attempted to restrict pool members’ access if they, or
other officers, did not approve of a reporter’s previous stories.
But above all, the military escorts’ interference with news-gathering caused the
most strife between the military and the media during the crisis. In a letter sent to
Defense Secretary Cheney, 17 top-level news executives and editors addressed this issue,
saying that some escorts “saw their duty not as facilitating but controlling.” The letter
stated:
The interference had nothing to do with operational security. It had everything to
do with sanitizing the nature of war and polishing the image of the military.
These experiences – shared by every type of news medium, with every service
and in every part of the war theater – make it clear that we cannot again be
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subjected to a system that requires all newsgathering to be under the control of
military monitors. (News Executives, letter, June 24, 1991)
So once again, the reporters claimed that military escorts and security reviews violated
their First Amendment rights. Some journalists compared the restrictions placed on them
to those placed on the press in Iraq. Associated Press Executive Editor Al Rossiter Jr.
wrote:
U.S. officials correctly pointed out that the movements and reports of Western
journalists  in Baghdad are tightly controlled by the Iraqi government…But I
suggest the same thing is happening to Western journalists attempting to cover the
war from Saudi Arabia. UPI reporters in Saudi Arabia are permitted to see only
what you and public affairs officers of the various services and those of the
alliance want us to see. We do not have free access to the various military units
and current pool arrangements are highly restrictive. (A. Rossiter, letter, February
14, 1991)
Such criticism did not change policies. In fact, more restrictions were placed on the
media. Five days after the war had begun, Williams barred the media from covering the
arrival of casualties at Dover Air Force Base. Williams later told a National Press Club
audience:
There is an idea somehow that we’re trying to sort of pretend like people don’t get
killed in a war, and that we do that by not allowing coverage at Dover, which, of
course, is ludicrous…There really wasn’t anything happening at Dover other than
the caskets being unloaded and shipped on, and that wasn’t the only place it
happened. (Williams, 1991, p. 19)
Public Opinion and Media Restrictions
 Media executives continued to fight the restrictions on information in the Gulf,
but found little sympathy from the American public. A poll conducted by the Times
Mirror Center for the People and the Press in January 1991 found that 76% of Americans
thought the military was censoring news reports from the Gulf, and 79% thought this was
a good idea (Times Mirror Center, 1991, pp. 12,16). In March 1991, the percentage of
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respondents that thought it was a good idea to censor news out of the Gulf increased to
83% (Times Mirror Center, 1991).
The Ground War Implements New Restrictions
When U.S. and coalition forces mounted a large-scale ground offensive on
February 23, 1991, Defense Secretary Cheney announced that press briefings at the
Pentagon and Riyadh would be temporarily suspended. He expressed full confidence that
the American people would support his decision:
I want to assure all of you that we understand our solemn obligation to the
American people to keep them informed of developments, but I am confident that
they understand that this policy is necessary to save lives and to reduce American
casualties, as well as those of the coalition forces. (as cited in Sharkey, 1991, p.
144)
The news blackout ended the next day, once it had become apparent that the U.S. was
going to win the ground war with minimal resistance from the Iraqis.
Six weeks after the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, the war was over.
Although short in time, it provided the most important framework for future conflicts and
the relationship between the military and the media.
Assessing the Restrictions
After the war, a Gannett Foundation Report stated, “More than direct censorship,
it was a lack of access to people and places in the gulf region that hindered
correspondents in gathering real news” (Gannett Foundation, 1991, p. xii). In response,
17 top-level news executives and editors sent a letter to Cheney that included the
documentation of problems with the pools, escorts and security reviews. In addition, the
letter included a Statement of Principles that should be considered for future guidelines.
These principles set the following provisions:
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• Independent reporting would be the principle means of coverage;
• Pools should be limited to the first 24 to 36 hours of a deployment and should be
disbanded quickly in favor of unilateral coverage;
• Journalists should be given access to all major military units;
• Journalists should be allowed to ride on military vehicles whenever possible;
• The military would supply public affairs officers with working transmission materials
for independent reporters to file timely stories with;
• Public affairs officers would not interfere with the news gathering process;
• Security reviews would be eliminated (News executives, letter, June 24, 1991).
By January 1992, all major points of the Statement of Principles were agreed upon, with
the exception of the elimination of security reviews (News executives, letter, June 24,
1991).
Conclusion
The media pool deployed to the Middle East provided America and the world
with what Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams called “the best coverage we’ve ever had”
(Hanson, 1992, p. 128). However, the press pool system implemented during the Gulf
War was criticized by members of the media. Most involved in this pool system never
saw a battle or the tragedy of death, like those involved in the Vietnam War had. Many of
the correspondents’ dispatches never made it back to their news organizations. And
above all, military officers often controlled every movement of the press pool.
Eventually, 1,400 journalists covered the six-week war between Iraq and the
coalition forces led by the United States. But the design of the pool system failed to take
into account the specific needs of different types of media. Reporters complained that the
number of pools was too few to produce adequate, objective coverage. But the American
public really did not seem to mind, siding with the military’s need to censor  reports from
the Gulf. Walter Cronkite assessed the war coverage after the Gulf War in an address to a
National Press Club forum. He stated:
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We’ve been greatly concerned about freedom of the press and how we assure it in
wartime circumstances…But it occurs to me that if the news media were as
interested in covering the peace, and the things that lead up to the war – to
commit just some small part of the appropriation that they had to dig into their
pockets to find to cover the war – we might not have these wars…it’s just
possible that this country would have been alerted…because of the news
coverage, and very possibly Hussein would not have moved into Kuwait in the
first place. (Cronkite, 1991, pp. 35-36)
With the exception of small operations in the countries of Somalia, Bosnia and
Kosovo, it would be a decade before a full-scale military operation would be
implemented. This time, the nation would be facing a war like no other. And the
American press was in the wings, waiting to be called up once again. Operations
Enduring Freedom and Anaconda would be the first real test of the Statement of
Principles adopted in January 1992.
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CHAPTER 7
REPORTING THE NEW WAR: PRESS COVERAGE AND
THE WAR ON TERRORISM
On September 11, 2001, the United States was thrust into a new kind of war.
Unlike the glowing bombs of Baghdad that the American public witnessed a decade
before, they watched as their own country was being attacked. Television news
broadcasts were saturated with the images of hijacked planes crashing into the World
Trade Center towers in New York City. Eventually the world watched them collapse
under their own weight, ultimately killing thousands of people. And later, as the Pentagon
was hit, Americans were enthralled by the images and continued to watch. Andrew
Sullivan, former associate editor at The New Republic, posted this message on his
personal news Web site on the day of the attacks:
I have been unable to think of anything substantive to write today. It is almost as
if the usual conventions of journalism and analysis should somehow remain mute
in the face of such an event. How can one analyze what one hasn’t even begun to
absorb? Numbness is part of the intent of these demons. (Nisbet, 2001, p. 2)
Like the Gulf War, Americans tuned to television for the latest information and
the newest pictures produced by the tragedy. For the first time in television history, an
unprecedented integration of media outlets occurred. CBS News coverage was also
carried on its sister cable networks MTV and VH1. CNN coverage could be seen on
TNT, TNN, and CourtTV. Even the all-sports network ESPN shed its programming in
lieu of ABC News coverage. So essentially, Americans could not escape the televised
images of the event.
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But television was not the only media outlet that temporarily changed as a result
of the event. Newspapers published special editions on the day of the attacks, most of
which sold out almost immediately. The San Antonio Express-News printed 50,000
copies of its extra edition on September 11, all of which sold rapidly. Three weeks after
the attacks, the newspaper was still selling 10,000 more copies per week than its usual
circulation (Downey & Leonard, 2002, p. 248). Leonard Downey, Jr. and Robert Kaiser,
both of the Washington Post, conceded that even though Americans tuned to television
during the onslaught of the attacks, “…September 12 belonged to newspapers, and
reminded us why, even now, decades into the electronic era, newspapers remain so
important. On the twelfth, all across America, people who don’t usually read the paper
bought a copy and devoured it” (Downey & Kaiser, 2002, p. 62). Newspaper circulation
increased exponentially on September 12. The Washington Post sold a million copies on
that day, more than 150,000 more than its normal press run. The Minneapolis Star
Tribune sold 50 percent more papers than usual (Downey & Kaiser, 2002, p. 62).
Referred to as a terrorist attack on the United States, the events of September 11 would
remain in prominence in print, broadcast, and electronic media for months. And it did not
take long for media executives to start asking questions as to how the government would
allow the media to cover this new war on terrorism.
The Pentagon Prepares for War
Once the shock and horror of September 11 started to subside somewhat, the
media focused on where the first stage of retaliatory attacks would occur and how much
information the press would be entitled to in reporting them. Pentagon officials
immediately said that America’s “new war” against terrorism would be fought with
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unprecedented secrecy, including heavy press restrictions that had not been seen since the
Gulf War (McIntyre, 2001). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld began to warn the
American media that they could expect little cooperation from the Pentagon because this
was a new type of war in which secrecy was paramount (McIntyre, 2001). In a press
conference almost a week after the terrorist attacks, President Bush said:
I want to make it clear to the American people that this administration will not
talk about any plans we may or may not have. We will not jeopardize in any way,
shape, or form anybody who wears the uniform of the United States. (McIntyre,
2001, para. 4)
To that end, the U.S. Department of Defense stopped posting the general locations of
U.S. warships on the Internet. In addition, no plans were made to allow reporters to
deploy with troops or report from warships.
The role of the media in the current conflict was debated immediately. Journalists
became increasingly more concerned that they would receive less information and less
access to U.S. troops than ever before. Pentagon officials were very up-front with worried
journalists. Pentagon spokeswoman Torie Clarke consulted with many journalists in the
beginning, explaining that the Pentagon would try to have journalists accompany combat
troops, although “there may be some operations where it’s just not possible” (Kurtz,
2001, p. 11). On September 24, 2001, the Radio-Television News Directors Association
(RTNDA) – a group very instrumental in the adoption of the Statement of Principles in
1992 – sent a letter to Rumsfeld asking to give the media as much access as possible to
military actions. In the letter, RTNDA president Barbara Cochran wrote:
RTNDA members and all journalists are acutely aware of the need to balance
national security considerations with the duty to inform the public truthfully. No
news organization wants to be responsible for putting U.S. fighting men and
women in harm’s way. But we also have the responsibility to keep the public
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informed about key government activities, which surely include military
operations.
I urge you to grant access as broadly as possible to the news media tasked to
cover the military. To avoid the problems that arose during the Persian Gulf War,
I hope the Pentagon will continue to support the nine principles of news coverage
of combat agreed upon by the news media and the Defense Department and
adopted as Pentagon policy on March 11, 1992. The principles provide a solid
foundation for future coverage decisions. (B. Cochran, letter, September 24,
2001)
The Pentagon had good reason not to deploy media representatives with the initial
movement of troops in Afghanistan. It must be understood that the media has often been
scrutinized in regards to its coverage of terrorist activities. The proliferation of terrorist
activities during the 1970s and 1980s has caused scholars and government officials to
look into the media’s role in promoting the terrorist cause (Eke, 1991; Bremer, 1991).
According to these scholars, the media coverage of terrorist activities give these
organizations a much needed venue for propaganda and possible hidden messages. And
so with this idea in hand, government officials were very leery of allowing the press to
cover the first stages of this “War on Terrorism.” Many government officials felt that the
accused perpetrator, Osama bin Laden, would use the media coverage not only as a ploy
to further his cause, but also as a strategic planner. Essentially, they believed that he and
the Taliban government of Afghanistan would monitor the media as their prime means of
intelligence. The government worried that the military’s plan would be weakened
because media coverage would disrupt the element of surprise.
The Pentagon’s Attempt to Calm Press Fears
Just two weeks after the attacks, Department of Defense (DOD) officials
attempted to calm journalists’ concerns that the media would be completely excluded
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from initial operations in Afghanistan. In attempts to appease these fears, Colonel Lane
Van de Steeg, coordinator of the DOD National Media Pool, said the department was in
the process of making sure that the national media pool was ready to deploy to
Afghanistan. Richard McGraw, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for public
affairs, announced the first members of the national press pool would be deployed from
October through December. Representatives were as follows: CBS Radio, NBC, Time
magazine, the Associated Press and KRT, the Baltimore Sun, Christian Science Monitor,
and Media General. The second wave of pool reporters would be deployed from January
through March 2002. The pool would rotate every quarter, according to Defense
Department records. Van de Steeg confessed, “We haven’t actually moved the pool –
deployed it – since 1997. So it’s time we exercise it. We’re all rusty” (DOD News
Transcript, September 28, 2001).
But the activation of the pool system did not come immediately. A week before
the initial attacks in Afghanistan, U.S. troops were deployed to at least four Asian
nations, but the national press pool remained idle (Shields, 2001, para. 3). In addition,
even as the bombing campaign heightened, the Defense Department stated that it wanted
to cut briefings from daily to twice a week (Shields, 2001, para. 3). This restricted
journalists’ news gathering techniques and once again caused a stalemate between the
media and the military. In response, 28 journalism organizations endorsed a statement
challenging the imposed media restrictions in November 2001:
We, as leaders of national journalism organizations, express our concern over the
increasing restrictions by the United States government that limit news gathering
and inhibit the free flow of information in the wake of the September 11 attack.
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...We recognize that these are perilous times when unusual measures must be
considered. However, we believe that these restrictions pose dangers to American
democracy and prevent American citizens from obtaining the information they
need. (“Journalism Leaders,” 2001, para. 2)
The pool system, which had been criticized by media personnel since its inception
after the war in Grenada, was once again scrutinized at the commencement of “Operation
Enduring Freedom.” Once the pool was deployed, the Defense Department made it
virtually impossible for the pool reporters to gain access to troops in neighboring
Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and other countries. Sandy Johnson, Washington bureau chief for
the Associated Press, stated, “We’re disappointed because the point in the pool is to get
the media to areas where unilateral coverage is difficult if not impossible” (Shields, 2001,
para. 8). Many journalists argued that it would be better to initialize an embedded media
system in order to accommodate full media coverage of the events in Afghanistan. Within
this system, journalists would be embedded in military units, accompanying troops into
battle and reporting on what was occurring on the front. And although Pentagon officials
toiled with the idea of this system with concerned journalists, they felt that the embedded
system would endanger the security of initial operations in Afghanistan.  However, as the
operations continued, Pentagon officials eventually allowed reporters to be embedded
with special forces in the region.
War Commences Amidst Compromises, Promises and Restrictions
The first bombs dropped in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, thus commencing
the war on terrorism. On October 18, Rumsfeld formally accepted the Statement of
Principles proposed during the Gulf War ensuring open and independent coverage of
military action (Shaw, 2001). And although reporters did not accompany the initial
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deployment of troops in Afghanistan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Victoria Clarke argued that the first time any significant number of conventional forces
were on the ground in Afghanistan, the media were with them to cover the conflict
(Brookings/Harvard Forum, 2002). To media executives, however, the media was
deployed too late and was to accompanying troops from the onslaught of war. Once
again, the Pentagon waited to deploy the news media until officials judged it safe to do
so.
However, many journalists remained skeptical about the full adoption of the
principles. For example, one principle opened the door for better access to troops in the
field, something journalists immediately requested as talk of war was imminent.
Specifically, journalists wanted to be aboard the USS Kitty Hawk, the base for special
operations unit, as well as have access to troops in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and other
countries in the Central Asia theater. Journalists were told that these requests were taken
into consideration by top Pentagon officials. However, according to Sandy Johnson,
Washington bureau chief for the Associated Press, “The answer so far has been no to
every request” (Shaw, 2001, para. 7).
As the war progressed, access to combat missions became increasingly difficult
for journalists in the region. In an interview with Peter Knightley, a war correspondent
for the American armed forces’ newspaper Stars and Stripes, revealed that he had been
informed of a Pentagon ruling that would not even allow him to accompany any invasion
force (Knightley, 2001, para. 17).
Reporters and news organizations had no choice but to follow the restrictions
placed on them by the Pentagon. In the immediate aftermath of September 11,
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Afghanistan’s Taliban regime ordered all foreigners, including journalists, to leave the
country. If reporters entered Afghanistan on their own and against military stipulations,
they risked being killed by the Taliban or being arrested by the armed forces. And
because of such circumstances, by necessity, the American media had to rely heavily on
the U.S. government’s account of events.
Three days after the first bombings in Afghanistan, Peter Jennings began ABC’s
World News Tonight with a report on war coverage. In a conversation with reporter John
McWethy, Jennings stated: “We’ve been [at war] three days now, [and] we’ve had three
photographs of bomb damage...Is the Pentagon unable to access what it has done or just
doesn’t want to share it with the public?” McWethy replied by saying, “It appears, Peter,
that the Pentagon does not want to share the details of what is going on. They keep saying
that it is a different kind of war, and so far it has been a war with very little information”
(Farhi, 2001, p. C1).
It needs to be understood that journalists did go beyond the protection of the
coalition military to venture out unilaterally. Doyle McManus, Washington bureau chief
for the Los Angeles Times, said reporters enjoy “excellent access to the areas of
Afghanistan not under the control of the United States” (“Terrorism and First
Amendment,” 2001, para. 4). However, according to the Committee to Protect
Journalists, 10 journalists have been killed during the war as of March 2002, including
Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, who was murdered at the hands of his
kidnappers, a group of Pakistani extremists.
One documented incident of outright censoring of the press came in December of
2001 when the Pentagon locked war reporters and photographers in a warehouse to
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prevent them from covering American troops who were killed or wounded by a stray
bomb north of Kandahar. The Pentagon later apologized for unnecessarily restricting
reporters access, admitting that it had made a mistake. But veteran war correspondent
Peter Arnett, who was criticized deeply for his pro-Iraqi views during the Gulf War, said
this corralling of reporters was not unusual. He reflected on how the military detained
reporters from the central battlefield in Panama for nearly 36 hours so they “could clean
up so we don’t see anything” (“Terrorism and First Amendment,” 2001, para. 7).
Like Pearl, many journalists went beyond military restrictions. Unilateral
coverage was important in obtaining unfiltered, government information about the war.
Prior to the October 7 bombing in Afghanistan, more than 200 journalists were convening
in Tajikistan, hoping to buy a $300 helicopter ride into northern Afghanistan. According
to Neal Hickey, “Some went by donkey, others in truck convoys navigating treacherous
mountain terrain. Several sneaked into Taliban territory garbed from head to toe like
women in traditional burkhas” (Hickey, 2002). Reporters’ lives were at risk, but they
wanted independent coverage and not rely solely on the Pentagon or national press pool
for reports.
Bin Laden Video Debate
Just a few days after the initial bombings in Afghanistan, a video tape of Osama
bin Laden was released by Al Jazeera, the Arab television news station. The White House
immediately objected to the global broadcast of this tape, asking the five major U.S.
television networks to limit the coverage of it.
During the Vietnam War, American Prisoner of War Jeremiah Denton evaded his
captors and sent a filmed message home. While delivering a rehearsed statement to
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Vietnamese television about how well he was being treated, he blinked out the word
“torture” in Morse Code (Spencer, 2001, para. 1). Officials in the Bush administration
suggested that bin Laden may employ similar tactics in the release of his video tape.
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer viewed the videotapes as being “propaganda
of a most insidious nature; at worst, it could be actually signaling to his operatives” and
“inciting people to kill Americans” (Allen, 2001, p. A8).
The networks gave in to government pressure and did not air the unedited
videotape to the public. Dennis Neal, opinion editor of The News Leader, wrote:
What was perhaps most unsettling about the episode was the unanimity and
swiftness with which the network heads agreed to limit their coverage. From now
on, only snippets of video issued by bin Laden or his followers will be broadcast.
Rhetoric urging violence against Americans will be excised, and any reports
accompanying the tapes would contain “appropriate context.” (Neal, 2001, para.
3)
Possibly unknowingly, the networks would set precedence on how the war would be
covered. They would succumb not only to government pressures, but public pressures as
well.
The Media’s Conformity to Public Sentiment
Perhaps the most heightened criticism by media veterans and scholars of the press
beyond September 11 was its conformity to public sentiment. For decades, media
professionals have taken pride in their individuality and their ability to scrutinize public
leaders, policies and actions. But in the wake of September 11, the media changed their
tune. Two weeks after the initial attacks on the United States, Fleischer stated at a press
conference, “The reminder is to all Americans that they need to watch what they say”
(Swanson, 2001, p. 28A). And although these remarks were stricken from public record,
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the media seemed to take this advice to heart as well. The media’s obsession with
scandal, sex, and celebrities immediately subsided after the attacks and during the
ongoing war in Afghanistan. “Anti-American” sentiments in the press were punished and
an ultimate suppression of the First Amendment happened within media organizations
themselves.
Only 11 days after the terrorist attacks, Tom Gutting, city editor for the Texas City
Sun, wrote a column criticizing President Bush. He wrote, “What we are stuck with is a
crippled president…He’s not a leader, he’s a puppet” (Swanson, 2001, p. 28A). He later
referred to Bush as a “scared child seeking refuge in his mother’s bed after having a
nightmare” for not returning to Washington, D.C., immediately after the attacks. The next
day, Gutting was fired and the Texas City Sun issued a front-page apology that ended
with the statement, “God bless America!”
Commentator and syndicated columnist Ann Coulter was dropped from two
newspapers after a column recommended invading countries, killing their leaders and
converting them to Christianity. Another column discussed “suspicious-looking swarthy
males” and a policy to require passports on all domestic flights (National Coalition
Against Censorship, 2001).
In addition, syndicated radio host Peter Werbe was dropped by KOMY-AM in
Santa Cruz, California, in early October 2001 after questioning U.S. military actions in
Afghanistan (National Coalition Against Censorship, 2001).
These are just a few examples, but media outlets all over the country were
cautious in airing dissent against the government after the attacks and during the initial
stages of “Operation Enduring Freedom” and “Operation Anaconda” in Afghanistan.
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Jonah Goldberg, online editor for National Review magazine, stated, “Dissenters now
have an obligation to think twice about saying some of the stupid stuff they say in peace
time” (Swanson, 2001, p. 28A).
Conclusion
Future research must commence to fully understand the impact of media
restrictions during the “War on Terrorism.” It is predicted that the war could last years,
and be fought on numerous fronts. And so, much analysis is to come. However, in the
few months after the attacks on the United States, the media’s conformity to public





Thus far, this thesis shows the evolution of restrictions of the press caused by the
poor relationships between the media, the military, and the public. Furthermore, this
thesis presents historical documents and speeches that have been examined by various
researchers, illustrating the progression of animosity and limitations set forth upon the
press. The theoretical aspect of this thesis illustrates the progression of First Amendment
suppression and continual animosity between the press and the military by examining
specific media coverage of two major offensives in two very different wars. Through the
use of content analysis, the remaining sections of this thesis will set out to answer the
three research questions presented in the first chapter.
Content Analysis
For many years, various authors have defined and used content analysis in their
research. Weber (1990) states that content analysis is a method “that uses a set of
procedures to make valid inferences from text” (Weber, 1990, p. 9). He continues the
definition by saying, “These inferences are about the sender(s) of the messages, the
message itself, or the audience of the message” (Weber, 1990, p. 9).
Yet in a different approach, Krippendorff’s definition of this research method
emphasizes “the relationship between the content of texts and their institutional, societal,
or cultural contexts” (Weber, 1990, p. 82).
Stempel takes a logical view of the definition. According to him:
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Content analysis is a formal system for doing something that we all do informally
rather frequently, drawing conclusions from observations of content. We express
opinions about the adequacy of various kinds of coverage by newspapers,
magazines, radio stations, and television stations. Those opinions are based on
what we observe as readers or listeners. (Stempel, 1989, p. 124)
It is Stempel’s definition that coincides with the thoughts of many media researchers.
Although, as consumers, the public casually reads a daily newspaper or watches its
favorite television shows, it is the job of the media scholar to delve into the popularity of
different media entities.
Holsti believes that regardless of the definition of content analysis, three basic
requirements must be met. First, the research method must maintain objectivity by
relying on formulated procedures and rules. Also, categories created in the analysis must
be done systematically and consistently. Finally, according to Holsti, “the findings must
have theoretical relevance” to the recipient of the message (Holsti, 1969, p. 5).
Throughout their various studies of mass media content, Shoemaker and Reese
(1991) argue that scholars should organize content research around specific theoretical
perspectives. These perspectives include the following: 1) content reflects social reality
with little or no distortion; 2) content is influenced by media workers’ socialization and
attitudes; 3) content is influenced by media routines; 4) content is influenced by other
social institutions and forces, and; 5) content is a function of ideological positions and
maintains the status quo (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991, pp. 4-5).
In conducting a content analysis for this research, these perspectives come into
play. The theoretical perspectives Shoemaker and Reese present assume that mass media
disseminate information that mirrors sentiments of society. Therefore, in judging the
negativity of reporting during both the Tet offensive and in the early days of war in
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Afghanistan, it is important to make the assumption that the mass media is reflecting
public opinion. Therefore, as previous research points out, the negative sentiments of the
public about the Vietnam War should produce more negative coverage in the newspapers
of the time. In the same regard, the patriotic flare of the public during the war in
Afghanistan should produce less negative connotations in the media’s reporting of the
events.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Content Analysis
As media research evolves, arguments can be made about the validity of content
analysis as a research method. Researchers such as Bernard (1988) criticize the use of
content analysis, saying there are many methodological problems in conducting such
research. He states that if one person creates codes and categories to be used in the
analysis of a document, validity may be compromised. In addition, if one person does all
the coding, there is no supreme check of reliability. Moreover, a systematic mistake may
be made in deciding which categories to use when coding different words (Bernard,
1988, p. 299).
But despite such problems, many researchers believe content analysis is
appropriate in some studies (Holsti, 1969; Krittendorff, 1980; Weber, 1990). Content
analysis is an unassuming method of data collection. Problems with data collection
influencing results are virtually eliminated. Holsti provides three classes of research
problems that may be addressed using the content analysis research method. The first
class involves data access and evaluation. In studying war reporting, it is appropriate to
access data in newspaper, television, and radio coverage. Previous issues of major
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newspapers are readily available in libraries. Therefore, the focus of this study works
well with the content analysis method.
Secondly, Holsti points out that content analysis addresses situations in which
language of the subject may be a necessary component of the investigation (Holsti, 1969,
p. 17). In examining the negativity of language used in this study, content analysis
provides a means of examination. Investigating speeches, interviews, and first-hand
accounts allows content analysis to be an effective mean in this study.
Finally, Holsti understands that there are situations in which the volume of
material to be investigated is larger in scope than is realistically possible for the
researcher to examine. Using content analysis, the researcher can sample material,
analyze this material, and make assumptions based on the samples (Holsti, 1969, p. 17).
When looking at the vastness of the Vietnam War and the War on Terrorism, content
analysis proves productive in narrowing the scope of articles to a smaller sample to be
examined.
Document Selection and Sampling
The documents selected for this research were all found in issues of the New York
Times. The New York Times was selected for various reasons. First, the Times is an
influential newspaper, read by government and military officials, world leaders, and a
widely-circulated public. Its coverage is in-depth, containing roughly 100,000 words a
day – about as many as a 290-page book (Downie & Kaiser, 2002, p. 65). In times of
war, the New York Times’ stories are often republished in local newspapers, accounting
for a wider circulation and therefore, influence of a larger audience, rather than just
subscribers to the Times (Downie & Kaiser, 2002, p. 101). The availability of the New
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York Times also contributed to the selection of documents from the newspaper. Finally,
the newspaper reported events of both Vietnam and Afghanistan, making the ability for
true comparisons accessible.
Articles from two periods were examined for this study: January 31, 1968 –
February 10, 1968 and October 8, 2001 – October 18, 2001. These periods were selected
because of the historical events that took place during these times. The 1968 editions
encompassed the Tet offensive, while the October 2001 editions included coverage of the
beginning of the war in Afghanistan. The 11-day period was used as the sample time
frame because the end of the Tet offensive occurred at the end of the 11th day of
reporting. After this day, no prevalent or consecutive reporting was made about the
offensive. Therefore, only the first 11 days of the war in Afghanistan was covered. This
method was used to ensure that equal coverage in terms of days was accomplished and
consistency in this study would be obtained.
Since the New York Times provided daily editions during both periods, a total of
22 newspapers were available for review. Only stories pertaining specifically to the Tet
offensive and the campaign in Afghanistan were coded. Sections A, B, and Editorial
pages were examined. Therefore, references to the war efforts appearing in Business,
Sports, or Entertainment sections of the newspaper were excluded. In addition, full-length
transcripts of speeches were excluded because they did not exclusively pertain to the war
efforts. During both periods, the New York Times provided a recap of the week’s events
in the Sunday edition. These recaps were coded because they both specifically mentioned
conflict of the Tet offensive and the fighting in Afghanistan.
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During the sample period, a total of 81 stories were examined: 37 stories from
January 31 – February 10, 1968 and 44 stories from October 8 – October 18, 2001.
Coding Procedure
Designing and applying a consistent coding scheme is imperative to the process
and validity of content analysis. Several categories were established to answer each of the
research questions presented in Chapter 1. A review of these categories is essential in
compiling the results of this research.
Research Question 1
Because of limitations set forth by government and military officials,
correspondents must rely on government reports from the front. Although some reporters
are able to go out on their own to report on events in Afghanistan, the number of first-
hand accounts of events must be limited. A comparison of sources is indispensable to
draw conclusions in this study.
Five categories were established for research question 2. The first category is
“government sources,”  which include Pentagon officials, the president, press releases,
and official reports. A second category, “first-hand accounts,” included quotes from
soldiers in the field, witnesses, personnel aboard air craft carriers, and civilians from the
region. The third established category is “enemy reports.” During the Tet offensive, this
category included quotes from the Vietcong, Chinese and North Vietnamese officials,
and reports broadcast on Hanoi radio. During Afghanistan, the sources included Taliban
leaders, Al Queda officials and Osama bin Laden. The fourth category was “other world
leaders.” This category included quotes from government officials outside of the United
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States. The final category was labeled “other” and includes quotes from family members
of casualties or soldiers, or members of various world organizations.
Research Question 2
Similar to research question one, question two pertains to sources for pictures.
Only two categories were established: “government origination” and “media origination.”
Although still an offspring of government restrictions, press pool photos were categorized
as “media origination.” Other news organizations, such as the Associated Press, United
Press International, and Reuters, fall under the “media organization” category. Photos
provided by the Pentagon, the U.S. Navy, Army, or Marines, were categorized as
“government origination.”
Research Question 3
In examining newspaper photos and their sources, this research focused on the
type of pictorial presented. Photos were coded as “combat” and “non-combat” pictures,
as well as “positive,” “negative, ” or “neutral” connotations presented within the





During the sample period, a total of 72 stories were identified as appropriate for
coding: 28 stories coded from January 31 – February 10, 1968, and 44 stories from
October 8 – October 18, 2001 (see Appendix A for a list of articles coded for this study).
According to the above data, more stories were available for coding during the
Afghanistan offensive than those written during the Tet offensive. Therefore, the most
accurate method of comparing the media coverage of both events is to first examine both
individually, then establish percentages, and finally compare the results.
The results from this analysis revealed several interesting trends in the way each
offensive was reported by the media. First, in regard to sources, the overall use of
attributes in Vietnam was almost identical to those used in Afghanistan. In fact, there was
an average of 14.21 sources used per story during the Vietnam sample, and an average of
15.14 sources used during the sample period in Afghanistan. Out of the 28 stories coded
during the Tet offensive, 398 attributes were made. Of these 398 attributions, 198 came
from government officials. Another 69 quotes came from first-hand accounts. The media
accounted for 26 attributions while enemy reports accounted for 17 sources. In addition,
another 40 attributions came from various world leaders, while 48 additional sources
were coded as “other.” Table 1 represents the raw data of this information.
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Table 1
Primary Attributions Published from January 31 – February 10, 1968





Other world leaders N=40
Other N=48
Total N=398
In Afghanistan, however, the number of sources used was much higher.
Throughout the 44 coded stories, 666 attributions were made. Nearly half of these
attributions (N=302), came from government officials. Another 177 quotes came from
first-hand accounts. The media represented another 36 quotes, while other world leaders
accounted for 98 attributions. Enemy reports were included 7% of the time (N=47). Only
6 attributions were coded as “other.” Table 2 represents the raw data of this information.
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Table 2
Primary Attributions Published from October 8-18, 2001





Other world leaders N=98
Other N=6
Total N=666
Table 3 compares the percentages of sources used during the two time periods
coded for this study.
Table 3
Comparison of Attributions from the Sample Periods
Source Vietnam Afghanistan
Government Sources 50% 45%
First-hand accounts 17% 27%
Media 7% 5%
Enemy Reports 4% 7%
Other world leaders 10% 15%
Other 12% 1%
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By strictly looking at the quantitative data presented thus far, it is apparent that the
complaints journalists have had over the years – limited access to the battlefield and
significant sources – is not supported when comparing the two offensives. In Vietnam,
reporters relied on government sources 50% of the time, while ascertaining first-hand
accounts only 17% of the time. In Afghanistan, reporters relied on government sources
45% of the time, while first-hand sources accounted for 27% of quotable material.
However, the types of quotes and accounts obtained by reporters in Vietnam truly surpass
those obtained by reporters in Afghanistan. In essence, the quotes attributed during the
Tet offensive are much more personal in nature. In a report from the first day of the Tet
offensive, correspondent Charles Mohr wrote:
“One VC threw a grenade at me,” said Private Healy. “It hit the wall and fell
down about two feet from me. I dived for cover and didn’t get hurt. I killed that
man with a grenade and later got three more with another grenade.”
His grim face was twitching with emotion as he told his story and a major gently
put his arm around the youth’s shoulders. (Mohr, 1968, p. A1)
Mohr’s account of the attack on the embassy is thick in detail. He was able to convey to
the reader what was being experienced, because he, too, was experiencing it.
On the first day of the attacks in Afghanistan, reporter Douglas Jehl gives a
different type of account to his readers. He writes:
Commanders have refused to discuss the mission in detail, saying that they did
not want to jeopardize the safety of the aircraft, pilots and crew. They would not
allow reporters to interview pilots in the hours leading up to the strikes, saying
they did not want to distract them from their work.
…Among the crowd of sailors who watched the planed  take off – and in some
cases, filmed the event with video cameras – was a young man from the Bronx
who gave his first name as Nelson.
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“My aunt works at the World Trade Center, but she was away,” he said. “So we
were some of the lucky ones. I’ve been waiting for this for a long time. The faster
we bomb, the sooner we can go home.” (Jehl, 2001, p. B3)
Notice that an apparent shift occurs in reporting styles. In the Tet account, the reporter
gives vivid details about the attack. But in Afghanistan, the coverage includes an obvious
condemnation of the military’s suppression of information, followed by a patriotic flair in
the form of a direct quote. The sailor quoted in Afghanistan appears to have the same
basic vantage point as the reporter does. Thus, both appear detached from the action at
hand. As another example of this detachment, reporter Thom Shanker wrote:
A B-52 pilot who took part in the mission said tonight that he and his crew did not
encounter any air defense threat for which they were unprepared, though he
declined to discuss specifics. “There was nothing that put us unduly at risk,” the
pilot said in a telephone interview, speaking on the condition he be identified only
by his call name, Woodstock. (Shanker, 2001, p. A10)
Although the above quote was coded as a first-hand account, it is obvious that the
reporter was truly separated from the action. It should also be pointed out that the reporter
received the quote over the phone. To that end, technology has truly changed the face of
war reporting. Emotions and sentiments that once needed to be obtained through face-to-
face contact, can now be obtained over the telephone. However, it examining and
comparing the discourse of the above quotes, it becomes apparent that detachment is
usual, and in many cases, accepted by journalists. Shanker and Jehl were not readily able
to convey the vivid detail that Mohr was able to penetrate to his readers.
It must be noted that most of the first-hand accounts (66%) obtained by reporters
in Afghanistan came from soldiers on air craft carriers who had just returned from air
strikes, like the one attributed by Shanker. During the infancy of the war in Afghanistan,
no reporter received such powerful first-hand accounts as reporters in Vietnam did.
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Qualitatively speaking, Vietnam correspondents provided a much richer account
of combat. On the first day of the Tet offensive, reporter Thomas Buckley wrote:
As the fighting raged, this correspondent was pinned down for 15 minutes behind
a military police jeep as tracer bullets arched a few feet overhead.
The bodies of at least two American military policemen lay perhaps 50 yards
away. Vietcong and civilian dead also sprawled on the sidewalk. (Buckley, 1968,
p. A1)
Although few in numbers, Afghanistan correspondents captured the atrocities of war in
first-hand accounts as well. Yet, reporters in Afghanistan focused more on the plight of
civilians than the tribulations of soldiers, due in part to availability of civilian sources. On
the first day of the Afghanistan offensive, reporter David Rohde wrote:
The strikes immediately led to a flow of refugees. At 2:45 this morning, 50 men,
women and children were seen fleeing north away from the front line out of the
village of Ravat.
They carried their clothes and other belongings on their heads, but made little
noise as they rushed out of the area. Rahim Shah, an elderly man whose eyes were
wide with fear, said he and other villagers had been ordered to leave by alliance
commanders. (Rohde, 2001, p. A1)
The imagery produced in these two excerpts are truly different. Buckley gives a
gruesome picture of death, while Rohde attempts to find that vividness, but falls short. In
my opinion, it is because of the emotional attachment Buckley had during the Vietnam
War, and the emotional detachment Rohde had. This is not to say, however, that Rohde’s
detachment could be helped. When the government limits access to the battlefield, they
limit the emotional attachment as well. This sentiment prevails through the writings of
the reporters, and the attributions of the soldiers.
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In the evolution of newspaper management, photographs have become more
prevalent in the daily publication of major periodicals. Photos are powerful and are meant
to provide needed imagery to the reader. Therefore, it is necessary to examine
photographic content to fully understand the detachment of reporters from the action of
current warfare. But because photos are more abundant in modern newspaper publication,
a higher sample of photos were published in the New York Times during the coded period
in 2001 than that of 1968. For this study, a total of 77 photographs were coded: 30
photographs during the 1968 period, and 47 photographs were coded during the 2001
period. For both periods of study, a series of crosstabulation analysis were run to
determine if the sources of the images contributed to the attitude the image portrayed.
First, the source of photographs must be ascertained. During the first period, only
two media sources were apparent in the publication of pictures: The Associated Press
(AP) and the United Press International (UPI). The AP contributed 22 photos, while UPI
contributed 8 photos. During the Tet offensive, no government issued photographs were
published. Table 4 illustrates the type of photo presented based on the source used.
Table 4




AP N=10 N=2 N=22
UPI N=5 N=3 N=8
Total N=15 N=15 N=30
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During the first two weeks of the Tet offensive, it was determined by the coders
of this study that no photos should be coded as “positive.” Therefore, the photographs
published either illustrated a “neutral” or “negative” sentiment. A typical negative
photograph published during the Tet offensive showed death, destruction or loneliness.
An Association Press photo published on the second day of attacks showed bodies of
guerillas sprawled lifeless on the sidewalk. In the background is a burning building that
these guerillas had set fire to before being killed. Obviously, the photographer was in the
middle of the action, readily available to capture the aftermath of the attack. In a similar
light, the AP published a photo of a South Vietnamese officer carrying the body of one of
his children from his home. Her young body is limp in his arms, and his helmet-covered
face shows his pain and disgust. But probably the most atrocious example of a sequence
of negative photos appeared on February 2, 1968. AP photographer Eddie Adams
captured the execution of a Vietcong is a series of three photos. The first shows the
executioner walking with the man as his face gazes toward the ground. In the second
photo, the gun is pointed at the man, and the photographer captures the fear on his face as
his eyes are closed and his lips are obviously trembling. The final photo shows the body
of the dead prisoner on the street, with the executioner putting his revolver back in its
holster.
Neutral photos, on the other hand, typically showed the outside of the embassy
walls, or soldiers walking the streets. No death or destruction is conveyed in these
pictures. For example, on February 3, 1968, the New York Times published a photo of an
armor tank advancing across a deserted street. It simply conveyed a picture of tank
movement, and not ramifications of tank assaults.
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Table 5 represents the raw data of the views projected by each published
photograph during the first sampled period, according to the source.
Table 5




AP N=18 N=4 N=22
UPI N=7 N=1 N=8
Total N=25 N=5 N=30
The first crosstabulation analysis performed pertained to the type of photo
published (combat vs. non-combat) and also to the sentiment the photo presented (in this
case, negative or neutral). Table 6 represents the results of this crosstabulation.
Table 6




Combat N=11 N=4 N=15
Non-combat N=14 N=1 N=15
Total N=25 N=5 N=30
The first ten days of the war in Afghanistan produced photos from a variety of
sources. Media sources during the coded period include the AP, Reuters, The New York
Times, and Agence France-Presse. Government photographs were also published during
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the studied period. Table 7 illustrates the type of photo presented based on the source
used.
Table 7




AP N=6 N=8 N=14
Reuters N=4 N=3 N=7
NY Times N=3 N=7 N=10
Agence France-Presse N=4 N=4 N=8
Government N=5 N=3 N=8
Unlike the results ascertained during the first time period, photographs published
during the first two weeks of Afghanistan produced both positive and negative
sentiments. Neutral sentiments were also coded during the established time period. For
the most part, a typical neutral image showed planes taking off from aircraft carriers. In
some photos, aircraft are shown lined up on carriers, ready to take flight. Similar to
negative photos presented during the Tet offensive, photos representing a negative nature
in Afghanistan showed destruction of villages, or in very few instances, images of death.
On October 10, 2001, The New York Times’ photographer Vincent Laforet photographed
a mother of a 13 year-old boy holding his limp body in her arms after he was killed. Her
face is shrouded, but her lips can be seen somewhat open, as if she was crying aloud. This
was the only photo depicting death during the second sample period. A typical positive
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photograph conveyed a sense of patriotism and humanitarianism through the images
presented. For example, on October 10, 2001, U.S. Air Force photographer Heather
Zokal showed members of the U.S. Fifth Quartermaster Detachment struggling with a
large container of daily rations for air dropping into the villages of Afghanistan. Three
men dressed in combat fatigues are rolling the large, refrigerator-type box into an upright
position. Readers can see the determination on the faces of the soldiers. Table 8 shows
the results of this coding.
Table 8




AP N=0 N=7 N=7 N=14
Reuters N=1 N=3 N=3 N=7
NY Times N=0 N=5 N=5 N=10
Agence France-Presse N=1 N=1 N=6 N=8
Government N=4 N=0 N=4 N=8
Like the first crosstabulation, the second crosstabulation analysis performed
pertained to the type of photo published and also to the sentiment the photo presented.
Table 9 represents the results of the second crosstabulation.
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Table 9




Combat N=3 N=8 N=11 N=22
Non-combat N=3 N=8 N=14 N=25
Total N=6 N=16 N=25 N=47
Table 10 compares the two offensives in terms of all three variables. Note that all
media entities are grouped together as “media” in the table.
Table 10
Overall Percentage Figures for Photos Published During the Two Periods
Photo type Photo sentiment
Source Combat Non-combat Positive Negative Neutral
V-Media 50% 50% 0% 83% 17%
V-Government 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
A-Media 44% 56% 5% 41% 54%




The media have chronicled American history since the country’s inception. They
have been present for tragedy, triumphs, peace and conflicts. It holds the responsibility of
communicating to the people of the nation, becoming the vital link between the public,
the government, and the military – referred to as Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity” (as
cited in Summers, 1989, p. 6). Some scholars still believe the media continue to play a
vital role in contemporary military operations (Hill, 1997). But the war in Vietnam
proved to change the overall role of the press in wartime. The technological advance of
television and its graphic images truly transformed the way Americans viewed war. The
lingering negative view of the press’ efforts in Vietnam caused a disadvantageous shift in
public opinion. But more importantly, the war illustrated a detrimental shift in the
relationship between the media and the military. The research presented throughout this
thesis explored this shift in the relationship, and implications that were to follow,
including what should be termed as “complaint discourse” among the media. Although
most U.S. troops who served in Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan
were not old enough to remember Vietnam, the conflict ultimately changed the working
relationship between the soldiers and the press. The Gulf War in particular showed strong
influences of the Vietnam War. A study conducted by the Gannett Foundation Media
Center to examine print and broadcast media from August 1990 to March 1991 found that
the word “Vietnam” was used 7,299 times in major newspapers, magazines, and nightly
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news broadcasts. This is compared to Saddam Hussein’s name, which appeared only
1,170 times during the same period (Gannett Foundation, 1991). At the conclusion of the
war in the Gulf, President George Bush victoriously announced, “This is a proud day for
America. By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all” (as citied in
Naparstek, 1993, chap. 5). This was evidence that the war in Vietnam was fresh in the
minds of America’s leaders and in the media as well.
The Vietnam War ended a nostalgic era for journalists. This would be the last war
that correspondents would enjoy unrestricted media access to the battlefield. But because
of media and combat technological advances, the ability for total press access is lost.
Historical precedence for the development of the military-media conflict lies in
technological advances that have evolved. Just as new technology is imperative to
military operations, it has become a significant constituent of the press as well. Perhaps
the overwhelming factor for military officials about changing technology was the
immediacy in which news could reach American homes. Satellite technology offers
instantaneous relay of news from the front, causing serious concern of national and troop
security by members of the military. Neil Postman writes:
Of course, like the brain itself, every technology has an inherent bias. It has
within its physical form a predisposition toward being used in certain ways and
not others. Only those who know nothing of the history of technology believe that
technology is entirely neutral. (Postman, 1985, p. 84)
Postman’s words become rhetoric of military sentiment. Military officials have often
charged the media with swaying public opinion regarding the Vietnam War. Just as
Postman describes, many high-ranking military officials believe it was the television
media bias that proliferated the negative images of the war into America’s living rooms.
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But Postman argues that another facet of television can be detrimental to war reporting
standards: “…Entertainment is the supra-ideology of all discourse on television. No
matter what is depicted or from what point of view, the overarching presumption is that it
is there for our amusement and pleasure” (Postman, 1985, p. 87). This statement is
examined in the context of evidence presented throughout this thesis. Television’s
entertainment value – its vivid portrayal of images and words – has caused it to become
the preferred medium of the public. But hard news stories, such as war, might not have a
credible place among television’s entertainment perspective. So perhaps, even when war
is being reported by television journalists, it is being presented from an entertainment
standpoint. It is this standpoint that causes many in the military to judge the television
media as not credible, causing continued media-military strife.
Marshall McLuhan writes about the social consequences of advanced technology:
In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things as a
means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be reminded that, in
operational and practical fact, the medium is the message. This is merely to say
that the personal and social consequences of any medium – that is, of any
extension of ourselves – result from the new scale that is introduced into our
affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology. (McLuhan,
1964, p. 23).
Within the context of this quote, it is important to examine the relationship between
technological advances and the public’s lingering view of press coverage of the Vietnam
War. This thesis looks at implications of both factors. But, ultimately, these factors have
caused the poor relationship between the military and the media. McLuhan’s words were
written during the infancy of the Vietnam War. But the impact of his statement is
prominent still today.  Television – and ensuing technological advances – have indeed
become an extension of our culture. The role of the television press in Vietnam is
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construed differently by various individuals. Television was no longer just an observer of
events; it had become a true participant in the war in Vietnam. Journalist Morley Safer's
1966 comments reiterates McLuhan’s assumption that the “medium is the message”:
The camera can describe in excruciating harrowing detail what war is all about.
The cry of pain, the shattered face – it’s all there on film, and out it goes into
millions of American homes during the dinner hour. It is true that on its own
every piece of war film takes on a certain anti-war character, simply because it
does not glamorize or romanticize. In battle, men do not die with a clean shot
through the heart, they are blown to pieces. Television tells it that way.
(Braestrup, 1985, p. 67)
As a result, the American public would not be able to witness first-hand accounts of the
horrors of war in Grenada, Panama, Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan like they were
permitted to during Vietnam. For military officials, the underlying assumption that the
press turned public opinion away from the government during the Vietnam conflict
causes the relationship to continue to be dismal. Without the technological advance of
television bringing the images of war into the living rooms of the world, the relationship
might be better. However, no one can attempt to stop technological advances. Therefore,
from the technological perspective, perhaps there is no way to mend the media-military
relationship.
By strictly looking at the quantitative data presented in this research, it is apparent
that the complaint discourse exhibited by journalists after the Vietnam War is
unwarranted when comparing the two offensives. But because of the overall lack of press
access to the battlefield, qualitatively speaking, an emotional detachment has occurred in
both sources material, and photographs.
As presented in this thesis, the powerful images of television have been attributed
to changing public opinion during the Vietnam War, causing many military officials to
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become skeptical of the media. But images presented in print provide the same type of
impact. Except in print, the images can become stronger – engraved in black and white to
be revisited over and over again. The photos coded for this study are two-fold. In
Vietnam, the powerful images showed death, destruction, executions, Americans under
fire, and fear in civilians’ faces. Interestingly enough, no photos found within the coded
time period could be considered positive. At the time, The New York Times did not
publish any government issued photos. All photos came from wire services, but all
showed the atrocities of war. Out of the 30 photos coded during this time period, 22 were
perceived by the coders as negative. The other 8 could simply be coded as neutral. So
television was not the only media entity showing the negativity of the Vietnam War. As
stated previously in this thesis, the Tet offensive became the turning point in the way the
war would be reported. The data for this study concedes to military official’s complaint
about the media presenting a one-sided, negative view of the offensive.
The war in Afghanistan is truly a different type of war. Therefore, the images
presented during this conflict would have different connotations than those published
during the Tet offensive. Because press access was so limited during the first few days of
the war in Afghanistan, the New York Times had to rely on a few government-issued
photographs. And within these photographs, the sentiment portrayed was much more
positive than media-issued photographs. In fact, of the eight government-issued
photographs, none portrayed a negative connotation. However, media-issued photographs
were considered positive only 5% of the time.
Technology was prevalent in reporting both wars. It was not uncommon for
correspondents to give great detail on the type of military technology used in each
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offensive. Reports published during the Tet offensive provided an enormous amount of
emphasis on technological advances of the military. Even headlines focused on the type
of weapon used. This aspect is important to examine. As presented in previous chapters,
the military has defended its claim that first-hand reporting of war is too dangerous for
reporters. Therefore, limitations must be set, according to military officials. However,
judging by the content of the news stories presented during the Tet offensive, military
technological advancements were just as prevalent as they are in modern wars. In fact,
the reporters during the Vietnam era made a conscious effort to report on the dangers
they, and the American troops, were facing due to the military advances.
Public opinion is very important in winning a war, as presented in prior chapters.
During the sampled time period, editorials and letters to the editor were used to convey
public opinion. Yet, only a few of each were published during the Tet offensive. Those
that were published focused on the negativity of the attack on the embassy, not
necessarily a critique of America’s involvement in the war as a whole. During the
Afghanistan conflict, editorials and letters were much more accessible. All were very
supportive of America’s efforts. During the sampled period, none showed any negativity
towards the war in Afghanistan.
The sample time periods for this study shows some weakness in the results.
Because this study compared a ground war to an air war, the combat itself was
completely different. Future researchers must look beyond the first two weeks of both
conflicts. Since the Tet offensive was considered the turning point in the media-military
relationship, perhaps similar research should be conducted focusing on two months after
the offensive. In the same respects, the ground war in Afghanistan happened two weeks
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into the conflict. So further research should be conducted focusing on ground war efforts
and examine how sources and photos were obtained. This would give a better
representation because the same type of conflict could be studied. It is difficult to come
up with a secure comparison of reporting on the two conflicts because they were so
different. As presented in this chapter, this is a case of ground war vs. air war. To get a
better understanding of the ramifications of restrictions, future researchers must compare
ground war vs. ground war.
Like the photograph comparisons presented in this study, perhaps future
researchers should look at the sentiments presented in sourced material in the coverage of
the events. This would give researchers an idea as to what type of quotes is being used in
the reporting. Perhaps more anti-American sentiments would be apparent after the Tet
offensive while more pro-American sentiments would be conveyed during the
Afghanistan conflict. Since propaganda is so important in war efforts, one might
hypothesize that government sources would appear to convey a more positive message
than other sources obtained.
But perhaps the most underlying assumption presented in this thesis is the fact
that reporters can never return to the nostalgic war reporting that dominated the Vietnam
War, and every war prior to it. Because of technological advancements, even soldiers are
detached from the front lines. Military technological advances allow for combat to take
place without soldiers being engulfed in the war, like they once were. Airstrikes prevail
over ground wars. Thus, the emotional aspect of reporting Vietnam may forever be lost.
In the context of this thesis, the strife between the military and the media appears
to be an obstacle in upholding the democratic principles that both entities are charged
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with maintaining. The military wants to uphold the utmost secrecy in war while the press
wants openness in reporting on the conflict. This strife caused an obstructed view of
conflict by the American people by the implementation of press exclusion and the
national press pool system. It instigated a competitive nature between the press and the
military, resulting in questions of credibility and biased reporting. Such competitiveness
resulted in the nine statements of principles that continue to govern press coverage of war
today.
And although the complaint discourse of the media continues to prevail, the
public does not want to fight for the nostalgic war coverage that dominated the Vietnam
era. The implications of contention between the military and the media illustrate a lack of
candor between the press and the public that it serves. This created a negative perception
of the press because of its intrusiveness, negativity, and bias that ultimately caused the
public to side with military officials in implementing press restrictions on the battlefield
in Grenada and in subsequent wars. A mid-November 2001 poll by the Gallup
Organization found a dismal 43% approval rating for the media’s coverage of the war in
Afghanistan, while the same poll showed an 80% approval rating for Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld’s handling of the war (Hickey, 2002). In a Pew Research Center poll,
half of the respondents say the military should exert more control over news from the
Afghan front and 53% favor censorship of war news when national interest is involved
(Hickey, 2002). As evidenced by these surveys, in addition to the one conducted for this
study, the public still stands behind the military’s restrictions on the media.
As evidenced by this thesis, the military is attempting to find middle ground
between extreme press restrictions and complete press freedom on the battlefield. This is
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an enormous step for the military. Threats to national security and the safety of
journalists and troops alike still plague the authority for absolute coverage. But, for the
most part, middle ground is not acceptable for the press. Examples from this thesis draw
from the media’s lack of interest in finding this middle ground that the military proposes.
Therefore, perhaps the relationship can never be mended. Without cooperation by both
entities, compromises can never be met.
The military’s answer to concerns over press restrictions was the establishment of
the national press pool system. However, correspondents now go beyond military
restrictions, reporting in a unilateral style, attempting to grasp the nostalgic way of
reporting war. This type of reporting was highly used during the Gulf War, when
reporters known as “unilaterals” went out on their own to cover the conflict. Reports
were filed using cellular phones, often before pool reporters could obtain the same
information. In the midst of the war in Afghanistan, the press pool system was deployed
once again. But within a few weeks, unilateral reporting was being implemented by news
organizations. Reporters were able to break away from military restrictions, filing reports
using the technology of video phones. Danger was imminent, but reporters still set out to
get the stories on their own. Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs, told attendants at a Brookings/Harvard Forum:
…nothing stopped reporters from going into Afghanistan. As a matter of fact the
most intrepid and the most entrepreneurial and the ones who were most
committed to getting the story did exactly that. For quite some time, there were
more media on the ground in Afghanistan than there were U.S. forces.
Dan Rather himself and his people for about two weeks straight were calling day
in, day out, calling me, calling several other people saying we want to go here, we
want to go there, and we gave the same answer we were giving everyone else
which is, “We only have a handful of people on the ground, it’s not appropriate at
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this time, we’re not going to do it.” God bless Dan Rather, he gave up on us and
got himself into Kabul and they rented a little space right there in town and he
started reporting from Kabul. (Harvard/Brookings Forum, 2002)
And so, perhaps the media pool is no longer essential. Since enough reporters are willing
to go beyond military restrictions to get the story on their own, the press pool proves to
be unnecessary. As of May 2002, eight journalists were killed reporting the events in
Afghanistan; each knew the dangers of reporting war, but all were willing to risk their
lives to present first-hand coverage that was otherwise not provided by the military.
Although both are important in the upheaval of democracy, the press and the
military perform two different functions. The military focuses on discipline, conformity,
and authority; whereas, the press is characterized as individualistic, liberal, competitive,
and independent. Accordingly, inherent strife is inevitable. If one was to pinpoint why the
two entities are at odds with one another, perhaps it’s because each of their roles in
democracy often counterbalance that of the other during times of war. The press has the
fundamental right to inform the public about what the government is doing, while the
military upholds its duty of defending American interests at home and abroad. It times of
war, when secrecy and security is of the utmost importance to the military, exposing
these secrets and operational procedures is the constitutional right of the media. So, it is
inevitable that a working relationship between the two entities during wartime is
inaccessible.
Above all else, the military’s attempt at a compromise in the relationship still calls
for the suppression of the first amendment. This thesis gives many examples and
implications of such suppression, and the complaint discourse that followed. However, as
much as the press complains about and attempts to fight restrictions placed on them, they
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continue to conform. Ideally, it is in the best interest of the press, and the public as well,
to go beyond government restrictions – to find a way to get the story like reporters prior
to Vietnam once did. But technologically speaking, this is truly unfeasible. America will
never experience another Vietnam. The nation will never be involved in guerilla warfare
like it did during the Vietnam era. Technology is too advanced. The type of warfare
needed in Vietnam has succumbed to advanced military technological warfare – combat
in the air before combat on the ground.
Journalists should give up the complaint discourse and accept the ways wars will
be fought. They should envelop technology and use it for their own good. Because as
technology continues to develop, it will become increasingly difficult for the Pentagon to
limit media access.
General Dugan said in 1991:
…there are no simple answers for improving relations. Nevertheless, it would be
advantageous for both institutions to find a continuing independent forum for
discussion and for researching ways to better serve the public interest. Both the
military and the media view themselves as professions. It would be a useful start
if each viewed the other is the same light – and acted accordingly. (as cited in
Sharkey, 1991, p. 170)
To begin the process, the military and the media must evaluate the relationship internally.
They must ask themselves how to better the relationship within their separate
organizations. Perhaps journalism schools should be charged with teaching young
journalists how to adequately report on military affairs. Military leaders, in turn, should
truly evaluate the First Amendment of the Constitution and completely understand the
freedom of the press clause. This freedom cannot, and must not, be changed in relation to
wartime. Whether in war or peace, the First Amendment must be upheld.
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In the future, scholars must continue to look at evolving technology and its impact
on military relations. In a matter of five years, the Internet has grown into one of the most
popular entities in our culture. It has become synonymous with the way our lives have
become—fast-paced and high-tech. Every aspect of life, whether it is buying a car,
getting advice about our health, or reading a daily newspaper, has streamed its way onto
the Internet. As a new form of technology used by the media, the Internet has the
capabilities of breaking through government restrictions in the war zone, streaming news
from the front to home computers instantaneously. Therefore, as this new medium
becomes more than a supplement to other media outlets, scholars should see what role the
Internet plays in future wars.
The future of the media-military relationship is unknown. However, the media
will continue to be an active participant in conflict. In the progression of developments
from Grenada to Afghanistan, it is apparent that there is a functional need to evaluate
whether the media and the military are working together in the best interest of
democracy. More importantly, a reassessment of whether the two entities are functioning
together in the best interest of the public they are charged with serving should be
conducted. The lingering images of Vietnam, followed by skepticism shared by both the
media and the military towards each other, will continue to plague the relationship. It is a
detrimental relationship that has evolved over centuries of American history. But both
institutions must comprehend the other’s duty and see that they have the same
commitment to the public they both serve: the duty to uphold democracy and protect the
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interests of the public. In order to serve the public better, the relationship must take a turn
for the better – in the interest of democracy.
After the American Civil War, Brevet Major General Emory Upton wrote:
The people who, under the war powers of the Constitution, surrender their
liberties and give up their lives and property have a right to know why our wars
are unnecessarily prolonged. They have a right to know whether disasters have
been brought about through the neglect and ignorance of Congress, which is
intrusted with the power to raise and support armies, or through military
incompetency. (as cited in Halloran, 1987, p. 10)
And perhaps it is this statement that should be the sentiment of both the military and the
media. Suppression of information – in essence, suppression of the press – becomes
almost hypocritical for the military. For a democracy to succeed, unfiltered government
information must reach the public. So in upholding the democratic idea, the military must
be open to complete press access to the battlefield. In this way, the media and the military
can move towards a more democratic coexistence.
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APPENDIX A
STORIES CODED DURING THE SAMPLED PERIODS
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January 31 – February 10, 1968
January 31, 1968     U.S. Aide in Embassy Villa Kills Guerilla With Pistol
January 31, 1968     Ambassador Safe
January 31, 1968     Johnson Receives Flow of Reports
February 1, 1968     Village Endures Night of Terror
February 1, 1968    Hue is Embattled: Other Cities Besieged
February 1, 1968    Embassy Attack: A Fight to Death
February 1, 1968    Enemy ‘Revolutionary Council’ Is Reported Formed in Saigon
February 2, 1968    Vietcongs’ Attack Shocks Washington
February 2, 1968    Hanoi Says Aim of Raids Is to Oust Saigon Regime
February 2, 1968    Enemy Toll Soars: Offensive is Running ‘Out of Steam’
February 2, 1968    Offensive is Said to Pinpoint Enemy’s Stengths
February 2, 1968    Foe Is Said to Execute 2 G.I.’s Before Crowd
February 3, 1968    Enemy Holds Out
February 3, 1968    Enemy Maintains Tight Grip on Hue
February 3, 1968    Warning is Given
February 4, 1968    Washington Stunned By One-Two Blow
February 4, 1968    Vietcong Holding Position on Edge of Saigon Airport
February 4, 1968    War Crisscrosses Suburb of Saigon
February 4, 1968    By Bus, by Truck, on Foot, Foe Built Forces in Saigon
February 5, 1968    The Vietcong Launch Their ‘Revolution’
February 5, 1968    2 Vietnamese at Embassy Said to Have Aided Attack
February 6, 1968    Streets of Saigon Shelled in Drive to Rout Vietcong
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February 7, 1968    Foe Using Tanks First Time, Mauls Outpost Near DMZ
February 7, 1968    Tension in Capital is High
February 8, 1968    Saigon Fighting Slows
February 8, 1968    Foe in Saigon Says He Will ‘Reconquer’ Capital and Nation
February 9, 1968    War-Ending Victory Seen As Aim of Enemy’s Drive
February 10, 1968  G.I.’s Enter Saigon to Help Eliminate Enemy Holdouts
October 8 – October 18, 2001
October 8, 2001     Bomb and Missile Attacks – Bin Laden Issues Threat
October 8, 2001     Blair Declares the Airstrikes Are an Act of Self-Defense
October 8, 2001     In His Own Words: Tony Blair
October 8, 2001     Thunderous Blasts And Bright Flashes Mark Kabul Strikes
October 8, 2001     Tension and Secrecy on Warships As the Jets and Missiles Roar Off
October 8, 2001     Routine Start In Novel War
October 8, 2001     2nd Wave of Troops Arrives in Uzbekistan
October 8, 2001     A Mission Begun, a Defiant Bin Laden and Another Crisp, Clear Day
October 8, 2001     Deploying Stealthy B-2’s, Military Promises Day-and-Night Bombing
Campaign
October 8, 2001     The American Offensive Begins
October 9, 2001     Scaled-Down Raid
October 9, 2001     Dusty City May Be Pivotal to U.S. Effort
October 9, 2001     A Wary Warship Launches New Salvos
October 9, 2001     Taliban Foes, With Supply Problems, Sharply Reduce Attacks
October 9, 2001     Rumsfeld Sees Long Battle; Says Bombs Aren’t Enough
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October 10, 2001    Commando Strikes
October 10, 2001    Pentagon Says Bombs Destroy Terror Camps
October 10, 2001    U.S. Raids Kill 4 U.N. Aides Outside Kabul
October 10, 2001    U.S. Planes From the Enterprise Are Using Their Bombs and
Missiles Sparingly
October 10, 2001    The Signs Of a Buildup Are Becoming More Evident
October 10, 2001    A Riskier Phase, A Widening Focus and Stress and Strain All Around
October 11, 2001    Strikes are Heavy
October 11, 2001    Attacks on Taliban Troops, Blackouts in Kabul and the Money Trail
October 11, 2001    Afghanistan’s Distance From Carriers Limits U.S. Pilots’ Flights
October 11, 2001    Murky Picture Emerges of Life Under Bombardment
October 11, 2001    Days Are Normal in Kabul, But Nights Are Terrifying
October 11, 2001    Wartime Secrecy
October 12, 2001    Long War is Seen
October 12, 2001    Enemy’s Planes ‘in Pieces’ Air Wing Commander Says
October 13, 2001    Uzbekistan to Let U.S. Use Bases In Return for Promise of Security
October 13, 2001    U.S. Raid Kills Unknown Number in an Afghan Village
October 14, 2001    Bombing and Diplomacy Overseas, Some More Warnings at Home
October 14, 2001    Pentagon Says an Error Led to Bombing of Houses That Killed Four
in Kabul
October 14, 2001    Strains of Hope in City Under Bombing
October 15, 2001    President Rejects Offer By Taliban for Negotiations
October 15, 2001    For the Moment, All Quiet On the Northern Front
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October 15, 2001    In Village Reportedly Struck by U.S. Air Attack, Destruction, Death
and Anger
October 16, 2001    Taliban Leader a Target of U.S. Air Campaign
October 16, 2001    Special Operations Gunship Being Used Against Taliban
October 17, 2001    Pressuring the Enemy
October 17, 2001    Pilots Told to Fire at Will in Some Zones
October 18, 2001    Bush Says Aim Is to Ease Entry Of Land Force
October 18, 2001    U.S. Tactics Thwart Afghan Rebels
October 18, 2001    Taliban Chief Urges Troops: Defy ‘Infidel’
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